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Despite the importance of power systems in today’s societies, they suffer from aging infrastructure and need to improve the effciency, reliability, and security. Two issues
that signifcantly limit the current grid’s effcient energy delivery and consumption are:
load-following generation dispatch, and energy theft. A load-following generation dispatch is usually employed in power systems, which makes continuous small changes so
as to account for differences between the actual energy demand and the predicted values. This approach has led to an average utilization of energy generation capacity below
55% [49]. Moreover, energy theft causes several billion dollar losses to U.S. utility companies [31] [16], while in developing countries it can amount to 50% of the total energy
delivered [48]. Recently, the Smart Grid has been proposed as a new electric grid to modernize current power grids and enhance its effciency, reliability, and sustainability. Particularly, in the Smart Grid, a digital communication network is deployed to enable two-way
communications between users and system operators. It thus makes it possible to shape the

users’ load demand curves by means of demand response strategies. Additionally, in the
Smart Grid, traditional meters will be replaced with cyber-physical devices, called smart
meters, capable of recording and transmitting users’ real-time power consumption. Due to
their monitoring capabilities, smart meters offer a great opportunity to detect energy theft
in smart grids, but also raise serious concerns about users’ privacy. In this dissertation, we
design optimal load scheduling schemes to enhance system effciency, and develop energy
theft detection algorithms that can preserve users’ privacy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Electric power systems were frst installed as a luxurious novelty in the 1880’s providing electric power to only a few people. Since then the power grid has been expanded to
reach almost every person on the planet, and it is essential to support critical systems, such
as telecommunications networks, stock markets, and health care facilities. Despite the importance of power systems in today’s societies, they suffer from aging infrastructure and
need to improve the effciency, reliability, and security. Two issues that signifcantly limit
the current grid’s effcient energy delivery and consumption are: load-following dispatch,
and energy theft.
Specifcally, the load demand in a power system depends on users’ daily activities
which is very dynamic and exhibits a peak-valley pattern. A load-following generation
dispatch is usually employed where power plants are turned on and off according to load
forecasts, and then minor adjustments are continuously made to account for differences
between the actual demand and the predicted values. For this approach to be feasible,
enough generation capacity is required to be available to meet the peak load plus a security
margin, which has led to an average utilization of energy generation capacity below 55%
[49]. Besides, energy users are usually several hundred miles away from power plants,

1

which results in a signifcant amount of energy loss due to transmission ineffciencies. The
Energy Information Administration estimates that these losses amount to 7% of the total
generated energy in the U.S. [55].
Another signifcant problem in power systems is energy theft, which causes several
billion dollar losses to U.S. utility companies [31] [16], and in developing countries it can
amount to 50% of the total energy delivered [48]. Legitimate users are also affected in the
sense that utility companies impose higher energy rates to amortize losses due to energy
theft. In addition to fnancial losses, energy theft enables criminal activities, such as illegal
substance production [16], and jeopardizes the stability of the power system.
Recently, the Smart Grid (SG) has been proposed as a new electrical grid to modernize
current power grids and enhance its effciency, reliability, and sustainability. Specifcally,
in the SG, a digital communication network is deployed to enable two-way communications between users and system operators. It thus makes it possible to shape the users’
load demand curves by means of demand response (DR) strategies, i.e., to encourage customers to change their usual electricity consumption patterns by fnancial incentives. One
such strategy is real time pricing (RTP), in which system operators charge users a price
that varies according to real-time energy generation cost. Since usually generation cost
increases as the amount of generated energy increases, users may want to shift their load
demands from peak hours to other times. Therefore, RTP can reduce the peak-hour load
demand in the power system, which in turn lowers the requirement on system generation
capacity. Another key feature of the smart grid is distributed generation (DG), where users
install and take advantage of renewable generation resources, and energy storage devices.
2

Thus, DG can help reduce the energy loss due to transmission ineffciencies and alleviate
congestion during peak hours.
Moreover, in the Smart Grid, traditional meters will be replaced with cyber-physical
devices, called smart meters, capable of recording and transmitting users’ real-time power
consumption. Due to their monitoring capabilities, smart meters offer a great opportunity
to detect pirate users in smart grids. However, since they are vulnerable to more types of
attacks compared to traditional mechanical meters, i.e., cyber-attacks, energy theft may
be an even more serious problem in smart grids. Although some schemes have been proposed for system operators to detect energy theft in smart grids, they require users to send
their private information, e.g., load profles, to the system operators, which violates users’
privacy. In particular, users’ private information may be sold to interested third-parties.
Insurance companies may buy load-profles from the utility companies to make premium
adjustments on the users’ policies. For example, they could fnd electricity consumption
patterns that increase the risk of fre in a property and increase insurance premiums accordingly. Marketing companies may also be interested in this data to identify potential
costumers. Moreover, criminals may utilize such private information to commit crimes.
For instance, the robbers may analyze the energy consumption pattern of the potential victims to deduce their daily behavior. They can even know if a robbery alarm has been set at
their target location [43].
The goal of this work is to design practical algorithms capable of realizing the Smart
Grid vision of a more effcient, secure, and sustainable power grid. To this end, we propose
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algorithms for optimal energy management under RTP and DG, and privacy-preserving
energy theft detection.
In Chapter 2, we consider a third-party managing the energy consumption of a group
of users, and formulate the load scheduling problem as a constrained multi-objective optimization problem (CMOP). The optimization objectives are to minimize energy consumption cost and to maximize a certain utility, which can be conficting and non-commensurable.
We then develop an evolutionary algorithms (EA) to obtain the Pareto-front solutions. To
further improve the algorithm effciency, we present an ǫ-approximate EA that obtains ǫPareto fronts of the objective space. The algorithms are validated by extensive simulation
results.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the optimal energy management problem in the smart
grid under uncertain energy user demands, distributed renewable energy resources, and energy storage devices. We aim to optimally schedule the usage of all the energy resources
in the system and minimize the long-term time averaged expected total cost of supporting all users’ load demands. In particular, we frst formulate an optimization problem,
which turns out to be a time-coupling problem and prohibitively expensive to solve. Based
on Lyapunov optimization theory for event-driven queueing systems, we reformulate the
problem and develop a dynamic energy management scheme that can dynamically solve
the problem in each time slot based only on the current system state. We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed dynamic energy management
scheme.

4

In Chapter 4, we address the energy theft problem with distributed, privacy-preserving
energy theft detection algorithms. Specifcally, utilizing peer-to-peer (P2P) computing with
a neighborhood’s smart meters as nodes, we solve a linear system of equations (LSE) for
users’ ”honesty coeffcients”. If a user’s honesty coeffcient is equal to 1, this user is honest. Otherwise, if the honesty coeffcient is larger than 1, then this user has reported less
consumed energy and hence is committing fraud. The users’ privacy can be preserved
because they do not need to disclose any of their energy consumption data to others. Extensive simulations are carried out and the results show that the proposed algorithms can
effciently and successfully identify the fraudulent users in the system.
In Chapter 5, we conclude this dissertation and discuss future work.
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CHAPTER 2
MULTI-OBJECTIVE ENERGY CONSUMPTION SCHEDULING IN SMART GRIDS

2.1 Introduction
In power grids, generation capacity is required to meet peak-hour load demand plus
a security margin. However, according to recent studies, the average utilization of the
generation capacity is below 55% [50]. This leads to ineffcient operation of power grids
because a portion of generation plants is largely unused or underutilized, but must still
be maintained and supervised to guarantee its reliability. On the other hand, as energy
demand, and peak load demand as well, continue increasing, additional generation capacity
will be needed to accommodate future load demand, which requires a large investment and
might lead to even lower utilization.
Recently, the Smart Grid (SG) has been proposed as a new type of electrical grid to
modernize current power grids to effciently deliver reliable, economic, and sustainable
electricity services. One of the key features of the SG is the replacement of conventional
mechanical meters with smart meters to enable two-way communications between users
and grid operators. Using the communication infrastructure of the SG, it is possible to
shape the users’ load demand curves by means of demand response (DR) strategies. One
promising DR strategy is real-time pricing (RTP), where utility companies charge users
with a price that varies according to the generation cost, i.e., the higher the generation cost,
6

the higher the price. The advantage of RTP is threefold. First, users may reduce their
energy consumption when the price is high, and hence lower their electric bills. Second,
peak-hour load demand can be reduced, thus reducing the redundant generation capacity
needed to meet reliability requirements. Third, off-peak load demand can be increased,
which can increase the utilization of the available generation capacity.
Most current research on real-time pricing focuses on how to optimally schedule all
users’ energy consumption given their predefned energy demand. In particular, MohsenianRad et al. [33] propose an autonomous load scheduling algorithm based on cooperative
game theory, where each user is a player and their load schedules are the strategies. Agarwal and Cui [2] propose a load scheduling noncooperative game among users that can
be reduced to a congestion game. In both studies, the single optimization objective is to
minimize the electric bill of the users, while the reduction of the peak-hour consumption
is considered as a desirable secondary effect. Moreover, Samadi et al. [45] propose an
auction based scheme where users provide their utility functions and energy constraints
to the utility company, who then replies with a set of prices that maximizes users’ utility
functions. A similar auction scheme is also proposed by Li et al. [28].
Notice that previous study mostly aims at a single objective, e.g., to minimize users’
cost. In this chapter, we formulate the load scheduling problem as a constrained multiobjective optimization problem (CMOP). Specifcally, we consider a third-party managing
the energy consumption of a group of smart grid users. All users submit their energy
requests to the third-party, which then optimally schedules their energy consumption so
that its two objectives can be satisfed. The frst objective is to minimize the total energy
7

consumption cost, while the second one is to maximize its utility measured by a certain
utility function. This third party can be a company, who schedules its departments’ energy
consumption in order to minimize the cost and maximize its gross income. Or, it can be
a community manager, who schedules the residents’ energy consumption so that the total
energy cost is minimized and its utility (e.g., life comfortness living in this community) is
maximized.
We note that these two objectives considered in this study are conficting and noncommensurable. In the literature, evolutionary algorithms (EAs) have been proven to be
effective in fnding good approximations of optimal solutions to multi-objective optimization problems [10, 12, 22, 25, 56, 59]. In particular, EAs aim to fnd a set of solutions that
approximate the Pareto-optimal front in the objective space, which all follow two basic
steps iteratively: variation and selection. Variation consists of choosing some solutions
from the existing (maybe random) solutions to be combined and produce new ones. Then,
selection is performed to keep the good solutions and discard the bad ones. Different
ways for selecting the best solutions and storing them have been proposed in the literature.
In this study, to solve the formulated CMOP, we frst develop an evolutionary algorithm,
called LSEA, to retrieve a set of Pareto-optimal solutions and show the trade-offs between
energy consumption cost and the utility. Then, in order to further improve the algorithm
effciency, we present an ǫ-approximate evolutionary algorithm, called ǫ-LSEA, to obtain
ǫ-Pareto fronts of the objective space. Extensive simulations have also been conducted to
evaluate the performance of the two proposed algorithms.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces system models
considered in this study. We describe the constrained multi-objective optimization problem
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 details the proposed evolutionary algorithms for solving the
CMOP. Simulation results are presented in Section 4.6. Finally, we conclude this chapter
in Section 4.7.

2.2 System Model
In this section, we briefy describe smart grids, and energy cost model and utility function model in smart grids.

2.2.1 Smart Grids
Smart grids have been promoted by many governments as a way of addressing energy
independence and sustainability, global warming, and emergency resilience issues [53]. In
smart grids, the energy consumption of each user is monitored by a smart meter (SM),
which is also capable of controlling the user’s appliances (e.g., turning them on or off,
adjusting their settings). Due to their communication capability, SMs also enable twoway communications between users and utility companies, via multihop wireless, wired,
or hybrid networks.
In this study, we consider a third-party managing the energy consumption of a group
of smart grid users. Each user submits its energy request to the third-party, e.g., 2 kilowatthour (kWh) between 10:00 and 18:00, before a day starts (0:00). Then, the third party
optimally schedules all users’ energy consumption (either locally or via cloud computing)
so that its objectives can be satisfed, which are frst, to minimize the total energy con9

sumption cost, and second, to maximize its utility measured by a certain utility function.
For example, this third party can be a company, who schedules its departments’ energy
consumption in order to minimize the cost and maximize its gross income. The third party
can also be a community manager, who schedules the residents’ energy consumption so
that the total energy cost is minimized and its utility (e.g., life comfortness living in this
community) is maximized.

2.2.2 Energy Cost Model
We discretize a day into H time slots of equal length, which are denoted by a set H.
A complete energy consumption schedule for user u (u ∈ U) during one day is given by a
vector xu = [x1u , x2u , ..., xuH ], where xhu is user u’s energy consumption in the hth time slot,
and

PH

h=1

xhu = eu , i.e., user u’s required energy consumption during one day. Then, the

total energy consumption of all users in time slot h (1 ≤ h ≤ H), denoted by Eh , is
Eh =

U
X

xhu

(2.1)

u=1

where U = |U| is the cardinality of the set U, i.e., the number of users in this area.
Besides, we assume that the energy price functions are known to the third party. One
example for such a price function is given below:
Ci (Er ) = ai Er2 + bi Er , for 0 ≤ Er < Gimax

(2.2)

where Er is the total energy consumption of all users, ai and bi are non-negative coeffis a upper bound on the energy consumption for this price function to
cients, and Gmax
i
hold.
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Furthermore, in practice, the energy price function may be piecewise. In this chapter,
we consider a two-piece price function without loss of generality, which is composed of
two functions denoted by C1 and C2 , respectively. Assume that a2 > a1 and b2 > b1 ,
i.e., the energy price increases even faster once the energy consumption exceeds a certain
threshold. Consequently, the overall cost function of consuming Er energy, denoted by
C(Er ), is

C(Er ) =





C1 (Er ),
for 0 ≤ Er < G1max







 C1 (Gmax
) + C2 (Er − Gmax
) + M1 ,
1
1










 ∞,

for

Gmax
1

≤ Er <

G1max

+

(2.3)

Gmax
2

+ Gmax
for Er ≥ Gmax
1
2

where M1 > 0 accounts for a marginal cost. Notice that when the total energy consumption
exceeds a certain threshold, i.e., Er ≥ Gmax
+ Gmax
, the cost goes to infnity. It means that
1
2
the third party is only allowed to use this much energy (i.e., Gmax
+ G2max ) at most, which
1
could be a constraint to ensure the stability of the neighboring areas considered from the
whole grid perspective.

2.2.3 Utility Function Model
In addition to low cost, the third party also intends to achieve high utility, which is calculated by a utility function. As mentioned before, the utility could be a company’s gross
income, or a community’s living comfortness, and so on. Usually, the utility functions are
non-decreasing with respect to the consumed power, concave, and results in a zero util-
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ity value given zero power consumption [45]. For simplicity, we use the following utility
function, denoted by V (Er ), in this study:
V (Er ) =

p

Er

(2.4)

where Er is the total energy consumption of all the users. Note that the utility value may
not have the same unit as the energy cost.

2.3 Constrained Multi-Objective Optimization Problem Formulation
In general, a constrained multi-objective optimization problem (CMOP) is defned as
follows [8]
minimize F (x) = (f1 (x), f2 (x), . . . , fk (x))
x

subject to gi (x) ≤ 0,

i = 1, . . . , m
(2.5)

hj (x) = 0,

j = 1, . . . , p

xlq ≤ xq ≤ xuq ,

q = 1, . . . n

where F (x) is the set of objective functions, gi (x) is the set of inequality constraints,
hj (x) is the set of equality constraints, and xlq and xuq are the minimum and maximum
values of each decision variable xq , respectively. A CMOP minimizes k objective functions
simultaneously, where the objective functions represent (usually) competing or conficting
objectives.
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In this study, we consider two objective functions, and formulate a CMOP as follows:
minimize
x

subject to

X
H

C

h=1
U
X
xhu
u=1

xhu

U
�X

xhu

u=1


,


H
U
X

�X
h
−
V
xu
h=1

u=1

≤ G1max + G2max , ∀h ∈ [1, H]




 ≥ 0, Su ≤ h ≤ Tu



 0, otherwise

eu − ēu ≤

H
X

xhu ≤ eu + e¯u

(2.6)
(2.7)

(2.8)

(2.9)

h=1

1 ≤ Su ≤ T u ≤ H

(2.10)

In the above CMOP, the frst objective function minimizes the total energy generation cost
during one day, and the second objective function maximizes the utility function. Constraint (2.7) guarantees that in each time slot the total energy consumption does not exceed
the maximum generation capacity of the system. Constraint (2.8) indicates that each user u
has certain energy demand which needs to be satisfed between a required starting time Su
and a required stopping time Tu . Constraint (2.9) represents a user’ tolerance of its daily
energy consumption, i.e., the user is fne with consuming eu − ēu to eu + ēu energy in one
day. Constraint (2.10) simply means that the starting time is no later than the stopping time
for each user, which are both between time slots 1 and H.

2.4 Solving CMOPs by Evolutionary Algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) have been proven to be effective in fnding good approximations of CMOPs’ optimal solutions. The basic idea is to use the crossover, mutation and
selection principles of Darwinian evolution to combine, modify and choose possible solu13

tions iteratively until a good approximation of the optimal solution to a CMOP is found.
Specifcally, crossover and mutation are probabilistic procedures that combine solutions in
order to make (possibly better) new solutions. Selection is a deterministic procedure that
discards the bad solutions found so far and keeps the good ones. Besides, selection procedures are based on the solutions’ ftness, which is usually assigned by an EA based on
Pareto dominance and the distance to its nearest neighbors in the objective space. Before
we dive into the details, we give some defnitions as follows.

2.4.1

Defnition 1

In a CMOP, a solution vector x is said to Pareto dominate another solution vector y
(x ≻ y), if xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ [1, k] and there exists some i ∈ [1, k] such that xi < yi ,
where k is the dimension of the solution vectors.
EAs are usually applied to unconstrained optimization problems. Some different penalty
functions and defnitions of dominance have been proposed in the literature to handle constraints. Penalty functions are functions of the infeasibility of a solution, where larger
values are assigned to solutions farther away from the feasible space of the problem while
smaller values are assigned to solutions closer to the feasible space. In this chapter, we
adopt the dominance defnition given by Deb et al. [12], which takes constraints into consideration and is described below.

2.4.2

Defnition 2

A solution vector x is said to constraint-dominate another solution vector y (x ≻ y) if
any of the following conditions is true:
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1. x is feasible but y is not.
2. Both x and y are feasible and x Pareto dominates y, as described by Defnition 1 in
Section 2.4.1.
3. Both x and y are infeasible, but x has lower overall constraint violation.

After an EA is executed, several non-dominated solutions, in the Pareto sense, are
obtained. Each of these solutions is a compromise between the multiple objective functions. In what follows, we frst propose an evolutionary algorithm to fnd Pareto optimal
solutions to the load scheduling problem formulated in Section 2.3, and then develop an
ǫ-approximate evolutionary algorithm to obtain ǫ-Pareto fronts of the solutions.

2.4.3 Load Scheduling with an Evolutionary Algorithm (LSEA)
An evolutionary algorithm is usually composed of several important processes, including initialization, selection, crossover, and mutation. In the following, we describe such
processes, respectively.
In the beginning, N random solutions, called individuals, are created to form the initial population P0 . The initial individuals satisfy constraints (2.8)-(2.10) but may not meet
constraint (2.7). Next, all individuals are compared to each other using the constraintdominance defnition (Defnition 2 in Section 2.4.2) and each individual is assigned a
rank according to the number of individuals by which it is dominated. For example, nondominated individuals receive a rank of 1, individuals dominated by only one individual
receive a rank of 2, and so on. Individuals with the same rank form a front. Besides, a
crowding distance [12] is assigned to each individual within the same front. The crowding
distance is a measure of how close an individual is to other individuals in the objective
15

space, where a larger crowding distance indicates the individual is farther away from other
individuals. Specifcally, crowding distance is computed in D steps, where D is the objective space dimensionality. In each dimension d, the individuals are sorted according to their
dth objective value. Then, we obtain for each individual the aggregate distance to its two
adjacent neighbors with respect to the dth objective. The frst and last individuals in each
dimension d are assigned a crowding distance of ∞ to preserve diversity. Finally, an individual’s crowding distance is calculated as its total aggregate distances in all dimensions.
Please refer to Function 1 in Fig. 2.1 for more details.
Once all individuals are assigned a rank and crowding distance, the next step is to
select some individuals from P0 , to create a mating pool for crossover and mutation. The
selection is done using binary tournament, i.e., randomly selecting two individuals from
P0 and comparing their ranks. The individual with the smaller rank will be selected for the
mating pool. If the two individuals have the same rank, then the one with larger crowding
distance is selected. If both individuals have the same rank and the same crowding distance,
then either one is selected with a probability of 0.5. After the mating pool is flled, the
crossover process starts. Each time two random individuals are taken from the mating
pool, called parents, to create two more individuals, called offsprings, with probability pc .
Then, the offspring are mutated with probability pm . Usually, pc is large and pm is small.
After N offspring individuals have been created, they are grouped in Q0 .
The ith (i ≥ 1) iteration will start by creating an aggregated population Ri = Pi−1 ∪
Qi−1 . Then all individuals in population Ri will be assigned a rank and crowding distance.
Individuals with rank 1 are added to Pi . Recall Pi has a fxed size of N . If there are
16

less than N individuals with rank 1, all individuals with rank 1 will be added to the new
population Pi . To fll in the remaining spots in Pi individuals with rank 2 are considered,
and so on. When the last front is considered, and its size is larger than the remaining spots,
individuals with larger crowding distances will be included in Pi . All other individuals
are discarded. Finally, a new offspring population is created by selecting individuals from
Pi for the mating pool, as described previously, and performing crossover and mutation.
When the number of iterations reaches a predefned threshold, say G, the algorithm stops
and the non-dominated individuals can be extracted from PG to form a Pareto-front.
Notice that the above description does not specify how to conduct crossover and mutation. Next, we introduce these two processes, respectively. In particular, we adopt the
simulated binary crossover (SBX) [3] scheme for the crossover process. This procedure
creates two offsprings, y and ỹ, from two parents x and x̃ as follows. For any u ∈ [1, U ],
h ∈ [1, H], we get
yuh = 21 [(1 − β h )xuh + (1 + β h )x̃hu ]
ỹuh

=

1
[(1
2

+β

h

)xhu

+ (1 − β

h

(2.11)

)x̃uh ]

where yuh and ỹuh are the elements of vectors y and ỹ, respectively, xhu and x̃hu are the
elements of vectors x and x̃, respectively, and β h is a sample generated by a random number
generator shown below:

β(v) =






1

1
(2v) c +1 ,
2

v≤

1
2


1

 1 [2(1 − v)]− c +1 , v >
2

(2.12)
1
2

where v is a random variable uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and ηc is a predefned parameter.
17

Besides, we perform the mutation process shown in the following. For any u ∈ [1, U ],
h ∈ [1, H], we have
1
yuh = xhu ( + δ)
2

(2.13)

where δ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
In the case that the kth decision variable of an offspring after crossover and mutation
fall outside the lower and upper bounds specifed in the CMOP constraints, they are reset
as follows:

yuh =


 h,lo


xu , if yuh ≤ xuh,lo ,





xh,up
, if yuh ≥ xh,up
u
u






 yuh , if xuh,lo ≤ yuh ≤ xh,up
u

(2.14)

Algorithm 1 in Fig. 2.2 further details the evolutionary algorithm for load scheduling,
which is called LSEA.

2.4.4 Load Scheduling with an ǫ-approximate Evolutionary Algorithm (ǫ-LSEA)
The evolutionary algorithm proposed above provides a dense and diverse set of solutions on the Pareto front (i.e., the Pareto optimal solutions). However, a dense set of
solutions may not be necessary because adjacent solutions provide similar trade-offs. In
the following, we develop an ǫ-approximate evolutionary algorithm for the load scheduling
problem.
We frst give some defnitions as follows [58].
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2.4.4.1

Defnition 3

Let a and b be two vectors of dimension k ′ in the objective space. Then a is said to
ǫ-dominate b for some ǫ > 0, denoted as a ≻ǫ b, if
ǫ · ai ≥ b i

2.4.4.2

∀i ∈ {1, ..., k ′ }.

(2.15)

Defnition 4

Let Y be the objective space and ǫ > 0. Then a set Yǫ is called an ǫ-approximate
Pareto front of Y, if any vector b ∈ Y is ǫ-dominated by at least one vector a ∈ Yǫ , i.e.,
∀b ∈ Y,

∃a ∈ Yǫ : a ≻ǫ b.

(2.16)

The set of all ǫ-approximate Pareto fronts of Y is denoted as Pǫ (Y).

2.4.4.3

Defnition 5

Let Y be the objective space and ǫ > 0. Then a set Yǫ∗ ⊆ Y is called an ǫ-Pareto front
of Y if
1. Yǫ∗ is an ǫ-approximate Pareto front of Y, i.e., Yǫ∗ ∈ Pǫ (Y), and
2. Yǫ∗ contains Pareto points of Y only, i.e., Yǫ∗ ⊆ Y∗ .
The set of all ǫ-Pareto fronts of Y is denoted as P∗ǫ (Y).
The main idea of ǫ-LSEA is to choose a parent from a variable size population A,
called the archive, and another parent from a fxed size population P . After crossover,
the resulting offspring may be accepted into the archive depending on whether or not it ǫdominates any individual in A. Similarly, the offspring may be accepted into the population
depending on its dominance relation to individuals in P . After a predefned number of
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offsprings have been generated, the solutions in the archive form a diverse ǫ−approximate
Pareto front. In what follows, we explain in details the archive acceptance and population
acceptance algorithms as well as ǫ-LSEA.
Regarding the archive acceptance algorithm, we adopt the selection strategy proposed
by Deb et al. [11] to fnd ǫ-Pareto fronts with guaranteed convergence and diversity, which
is described by Procedure 1 in Fig. 2.3. This algorithm divides the two-dimensional objective space into boxes of size ǫ × ǫ and stores in an archive only one non-dominated
solution per box on the ǫ-Pareto fronts. Using a generalized dominance relation on these
boxes, the algorithm maintains a set of non-dominated boxes, and hence guaranteeing the
ǫ-approximation property. In particular, Procedure 1 in Fig. 2.3 accepts or rejects an offspring as follows. We frst identify the solutions in the archive that are dominated by the
current offspring. Here, dominance relation is determined using the vector b of each solution obtained with Function in 2 Fig. 2.4. If the offspring dominates any solution, the
dominated solution is removed and the offspring is added to the archive. When there are
no box-dominated solutions in the archive, we further check two cases. First, if the offspring lies inside a box occupied by an archive solution, then the dominating solution in
the Pareto-sense is kept in the archive and the dominated solution is discarded. Second,
if the offspring lies inside a box where there is no archive solution, the offspring is added
to the archive. Moreover, since in each box there is only one non-dominated solution, the
convergence property can be guaranteed, too.
In addition, we have the following theorem [26].
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2.4.4.4

Theorem 1

Let Y(t) =

St

j=1

(j)

y(j) , 1 ≤ yi

≤ B, be the set of all objective vectors created by

a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm and given to the selection operator defned in
Procedure 1 in Fig. 2.3. Then A(t) is an ǫ-Pareto set of Y(t) with bounded size, i.e.,
A(t) ∈ P∗ǫ (Y(t) )
|A(t) | ≤

� log B k−1
log ǫ

(2.17)
(2.18)

Our population acceptance mechanism, described by Procedure 2 in Fig. 2.6, uses
dominance relations and crowding distances to accept an offspring into the population
or reject it. In particular, the algorithm works as follows. First, a crowding distance is
assigned to each population individual p in Pg−1 using Function 1 in Fig. 2.1. Next, it is
determined if offspring q dominates any p. If it does, the algorithm replaces the dominated
p that has the lowest crowding distance CD with q. In case q is dominated by any p, it is
rejected. On the other hand, if q does not dominate any p and it is also non-dominated, the
p with the lowest CD among all individuals in Pg−1 is replaced by q. If several individuals
have the same lowest CD, then a randomly chosen one is replaced by q. Finally, the
procedure returns the updated population Pg . Notice that this procedure only compares the
offspring with all members of the population Pg−1 , rather than compare it with all members
of the whole population as in Algorithm 1 in Fig. 2.2. This keeps the computational cost
low, and the use of crowding distances maintains a well spread population.
Finally, we describe in details the ǫ-approximate evolutionary algorithm (ǫ-LSEA) for
the load scheduling problem detailed by Algorithm 2 in Fig. 2.5. Initially, a random
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population P0 is created satisfying constraints (2.8)-(2.10) specifed in the CMOP. Then,
the non-dominated individuals in P0 are copied into archive A. In the gth iteration, an
individual p is randomly selected from the population Pg−1 using binary tournament and
another solution a is randomly chosen from the archive A to form the mating pool. The
parent individuals, p and a, are used for crossover, and the resulting offspring q is subject
to mutation. Unlike that in the previous algorithm, only one offspring q is generated per
iteration. Next, offspring q is accepted or rejected from the population using Procedure 2
in Fig. 2.6. Lastly, Procedure 1 in Fig. 2.3 is used to decide whether or not offspring q is
added into the archive A. The algorithm stops after a predefned number of offsprings G
have been generated. Since fewer solutions are needed to converge to the Pareto-front, this
algorithm has a shorter computation time than Algorithm 1 in Fig. 2.2.

2.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we conduct simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed two
algorithms, i.e., Load Scheduling with an EA (LSEA, Algorithm 1 in Fig. 2.2) and Load
Scheduling with an ǫ-approximate EA (ǫ-LSEA, Algorithm 2 in Fig. 2.5), respectively. The
proposed algorithms are implemented in Matalb2011b on a general purpose computer with
a 3.4GHz CPU and 4GB RAM memory. The parameters for the cost function in equation
(2.3) are presented in Table 2.1, and some parameters indicated in constraints (2.7), (2.8)
and (2.9) are given in Table 2.2 which are the same for all users. Besides, when two parents
are selected for reproduction, the crossover process (SBX) will be applied with probability
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pm = 0.9 and ηc = 0, and each offspring will mutate with probability pm = e−g/G , where
g is the number of the current iteration and G is the predefned iteration number.

2.5.1 LSEA
We frst evaluate the performance of LSEA with 5, 15, 25 and 50 users, respectively.
In particular, each user has a daily energy requirement eu , which is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 24 kWh, to be scheduled throughout 24 hours. Fig. 2.7(a) shows the
obtained Pareto-front for 5 users. Each cross in the graph represents a solution found by
LSEA and its position is determined by the values of the corresponding objective functions.
We can observe that the range of the cost objective goes from $2 to $48 and the utility
function spans from 10 to 70. These solutions in objective space provide us with a wide set
of trade-offs between the total energy consumption cost and the overall utility. Moreover,
we notice that the Pareto-front is densely populated, i.e., adjacent solutions are very close
to each other. Fig. 2.7(b)-2.7(d) show similar results for the cases of 15, 25 and 50 users,
respectively.

2.5.2 ǫ-LSEA
Next, we show the performance of ǫ-LSEA with 5, 15, 25 and 50 users, respectively.
The same as before, we assume that each user has a daily energy requirement eu , which
is uniformly distributed between 0 and 24 kWh, to be scheduled throughout 24 hours. As
shown in Fig. 2.8(a), we can easily see there is an ǫ-Pareto front with only a few solutions,
which can make the fnal decision easier. Fig. 2.8(b)-2.8(d) also show an ǫ-Pareto front
that can be easily identifed. Moreover, in these three cases the results are obtained using a
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large number of iterations. However, as we will show in the next section, in fact a lot fewer
generations are enough to obtain an ǫ-Pareto front. Here, we show the results with a large
number of iterations after an ǫ-Pareto front has been identifed to be sure that the algorithm
has converged.
Moreover, the time and the number of iterations needed for obtaining the results shown
in Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8 are presented in Table 2.3. We can see that the effciency of ǫLSEA is higher than that of LSEA, and the effciency improvement gets more signifcant
when the number of users becomes larger.

2.5.3 Convergence of LSEA and ǫ-LSEA
Finally, we compare the convergence speed of LSEA and ǫ-LSEA by looking into the
evolution of the population of LSEA and of the archive of ǫ-LSEA, when the number of
users is 25. Fig. 2.9(a)-2.9(d) show the progress of the population of LSEA when the
running time is equal to 15, 90, 240, and 600 minutes, respectively. We can fnd that a
good Pareto front can be found only after 600 minutes. Compared to that, we can see in
Fig. 2.10(a)-2.10(d) that a good ǫ-Pareto front can be achieved after 120 minutes, which
is much faster. Besides, considering the modest capability of the computer used to run
these simulations, the third party usually would have more computing resources and thus
even shorter computation time. It can also employ cloud computing to accomplish the load
scheduling tasks, which would further reduce the computation time.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we consider a third-party managing the energy consumption of a group
of smart grid users, and formulate the load scheduling problem as a constrained multiobjective optimization problem. The frst objective is to minimize the total energy consumption cost, while the second is to maximize its utility measured by a certain utility
function. To solve the problem, we frst develop an evolutionary algorithm, called LSEA,
to retrieve a set of Pareto-optimal solutions and show the trade-offs between energy consumption cost and the utility. Then, in order to further improve the algorithm effciency, we
present an ǫ-approximate evolutionary algorithm, called ǫ-LSEA, to obtain ǫ-Pareto fronts
of the objective space. Extensive simulations have also been conducted to evaluate the performance of the two proposed algorithms. We can observe that ǫ-LSEA is more effcient
compared to LSEA.
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Input: Individuals pk ’s in front Z, objective space dimension D
1: Calculate for each individual pk the objective values fk,1 , . . . , fk,D in the objective

space
2: Set Ik to 0 for each individual pk
3: for d = 1 to D do
4:

Sort individuals pk ’s in Z in ascending order according to fk,d

5:

The crowding distance of the frst and of the last individual are set to infnity

6:

for k = 2 to the size of Z minus 1 do
Ik = Ik + (fk−1,d − fk+1,d )/(maxk {fk,d } − mink {fk,d })

7:
8:

end for

9: end for

Output: Crowding distances Ik ’s
Figure 2.1
Function 1: Crowding Distance Assignment

Table 2.1
Cost Function Parameters (U : the number of users, H = 24)
a1

b1

a2

b2

Gmax
1

Gmax
2

M1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.6

8U/H

16U/H

1
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Input: N
1: Create an random initial population, P0 of size N , satisfying constraints (2.8)-

(2.10) in the CMOP
2: Apply non-dominating sorting to P0
3: Apply binary tournament to P0 to fll mating pool
4: Crossover individuals in mating pool to fll offspring set Q0
5: Apply mutation to Q0
6: Set the maximum number of generations, G
7: for g = 1 to G do
8:

Rg = Pg−1 ∪ Qg−1

9:

Apply non-dominating sorting to Rg

10:

Apply binary tournament to Rg to fll mating pool

11:

Apply crossover to individuals in mating pool to generate Qg

12:

Apply mutation to individuals in Qg

13:

Create Pg

14: end for

Output: Non-dominated individuals in PG
Figure 2.2
Algorithm 1: Load Scheduling with an EA (LSEA)
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Input: A, f
1: D := {f ′ ∈ A|box(f ) ≻ box(f ′ )}
2: if D 6= ∅ then
3:

A′ = A ∪ f \ D

4: else if ∃f ′ : (box(f ′ ) = box(f ) ∧ f ≻ f ′ ) then
5:

A′ = A ∪ f \ f ′

6: else if ∄f ′ : box(f ′ ) = box(f ) ∨ box(f ′ ) ≻ box(f ) then
7:

A′ = A ∪ f

8: else
9:

A′ = A

10: end if

Output: A′
Figure 2.3
Procedure 1: Selection Process for ǫ-Pareto Front

Table 2.2
Parameters in Constraints (2.7)-(2.9)
Su

Tu

ēu

0

24

0.5kW
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Input: f
1: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} do
2:

log fi
bi = ⌊ log
⌋
1+ǫ

3: end for
4: b = (bi , . . . , bm )

Output: b
Figure 2.4
Function 2: box

Table 2.3
Completion Time
ǫ-LSEA

LSEA
Users

Time(mins)

Generations

Time(mins) Generations

5

25

92 × 103

15

26 × 103

15

548

1 × 106

495

5 × 106

25

1312

1.5 × 106

632

13 × 106

50

10033

1 × 106

4978

14 × 106
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1: Create a random initial population, P0 of size N , satisfying constraints (2.8)-(2.10)

in the CMOP
2: Copy non-dominated individuals in P0 to A
3: for g = 1 to G do
4:

Choose a solution p from Pg−1 using binary tournament, and a solution a
from A at random

5:

Use p and a as parents to create one offspring q.

6:

Apply mutation to q resulting in q ′

7:

Run Procedure 2 to decide if q ′ is included in population Pg

8:

Run Procedure 1 to decide if q ′ is included in the achieve A

9: end for

Output: ǫ-Pareto fronts in A
Figure 2.5
Algorithm 2: Load Scheduling with an ǫ-Approximate EA (ǫ-LSEA)
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Input: population Pg−1 , offspring q
1: Apply Function 1 to Pg−1 to assign crowding distances CD to each population

individual p
2: if ∃ p : q ≻ p then
3:

Replace the individual p that is dominated by the offspring q and has the
smallest CD with q (or break ties randomly).

4: else if ∃ p : p ≻ q then
5:

Discard q

6: else
7:

Replace the p with the smallest CD with offspring q (or break ties randomly).

8: end if

Output: Pg
Figure 2.6
Procedure 2: Population Acceptance Procedure for ǫ-LSEA
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Figure 2.7
Pareto front for 5, 15, 25, and 50 users respectively, using LSEA.
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ǫ-Pareto front for 5, 15, 25, 50 users, respectively, using ǫ-LSEA.
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Figure 2.9
Population evolution using LSEA at different generations for 25 users.
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Population evolution using ǫ-LSEA at different generations for 25 users.
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMIC ENERGY MANAGEMENT FOR THE SMART GRID WITH
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES

3.1 Introduction
Largely underutilized generation capacity and high transmission losses are two major
sources of system ineffciency in traditional power grids. Recent studies show that the average utilization of the generation capacity is below 55% [49] and 7% of generated energy
is lost due to transmission ineffciencies [55]. In particular, since enough generation capacity is required to be available to meet peak-hour load demand plus a security margin, some
power plants are largely unused or underutilized. Besides, energy users are usually several
hundreds of miles away from power plants, which inevitably results in a signifcant amount
of energy loss due to transmission ineffciencies. Moreover, overall electricity consumption is projected to increase by about 14% in the next 20 years [54], which will require
a big investment to expand the generation and transmission capacity to accommodate the
new demand.
Recently, the Smart Grid (SG) has been proposed as a new electrical grid to modernize
current power grids and enhance its effciency, reliability, and sustainability. Particularly,
in the SG, a digital communication network is deployed to enable two-way communications between users and system operators. It thus makes it possible to shape the users’
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load demand curves by means of demand response (DR) strategies, i.e., to encourage customers to change their usual electricity consumption patterns by incentives [4]. One such
strategy is real time pricing (RTP), in which system operators charge users a price that
varies according to real-time energy generation cost. Since usually generation cost increases as the amount of generated energy increases, users may want to shift their load
demands from peak hours to other times. Therefore, RTP can reduce the peak-hour load
demand in the power system, which in turn lowers the requirement on system generation
capacity. It can also reduce users’ electricity bills by encouraging them to consume more
power during hours with lower electricity prices. Another feature of the Smart Grid is distributed generation (DG), where users install and take advantage of renewable generation
resources (such as solar panels and wind turbines), and energy storage devices (e.g., batteries). In DG, users determine whether to immediately consume their own (generated or
stored) energy, store it, or sell it to the grid. Thus, DG can help reduce the energy loss due
to transmission ineffciencies, alleviate congestion during peak hours, reduce the system’s
carbon footprints, and lower users’ electricity bills.
Due to unpredictable realtime prices and distributed energy resources, the Smart Grid
poses great challenges for energy management (or load scheduling) with RTP and DG.
Most previous studies focus on obtaining load schedules for customers in day-ahead scenarios based on the their load requirement. In particular, Goudarzi et al. [19] propose a
mixed-integer optimization problem to fnd a load schedule that minimizes a customer’s
energy consumption cost plus an inconvenience function. Du et al. [15] present a two-step
optimization algorithm to minimize a user’s energy cost to run thermostatically controlled
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appliances. Gatsis and Giannakis [17] develop a day-ahead scheduling scheme considering imperfect information between the utility company and the customers due to packet
loss. Mohsenian-Rad et al. [33] employ game theory to fnd an optimal daily load schedule
for each user that minimizes the total energy generation cost. Shinwari et al. [47] design
a water-flling based algorithm, which results in almost fat total power consumption of
a neighborhood so as to minimize the changes in load demand per hour and reduce the
utility company’s operational costs. Salinas et al. [44] investigate a constrained multiobjective optimization problem (CMOP) to manage the energy consumption of a group of
users. They develop two evolutionary algorithms to obtain the Pareto-front solutions and
the ǫ-Pareto front solutions to the CMOP, respectively. Joe-Wang et al. [23] formulate a
linear optimization problem to maximize the utility company’s revenue. Note that all these
studies require users to know exactly their load demands ahead of time, which may not be
always predicted and can be uncertain. Besides, none of the above studies considers DG,
energy storage management, or the possibility of users selling energy to the grid, which
are essential and appealing features of the SG. In contrast, Neely et al. [37] develop an
algorithm to minimize the long- term average expected cost of a utility company, which
supplies power by a traditional power plant and a renewable energy resource. Individual
user’s load demand and energy storage devices are not considered. In [52], Urgaonkar et al.
study a similar problem for a data center with an uninterruptible power supply that acts as
an energy storage device. Guo et al. [20] propose an algorithm to minimize one user’s long
term expected energy cost considering a renewable energy resource and a battery. Note
that essentially these works deal with one single load demand.
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In this chapter, we investigate the optimal energy management problem in the smart
grid, taking into account customers’ uncertain load demands, and distributed renewable
energy resources and energy storage devices. Specifcally, we consider an electric power
distribution network consisting of a set of energy users, who have two-way real-time communications with a utility company. Each user has a renewable energy resource, an energy
storage device, and a connection to the power grid, which collaboratively satisfy its load
demand. The utility company provides energy to the users from both a traditional power
plant (e.g., coal, gas) and a renewable energy resource (e.g., solar bank, wind farm). We
model users’ load demands and all renewable energy resources’ as stochastic processes to
account for their uncertainty. Besides, we consider that the system works in a time-slotted
fashion. We aim to optimally schedule the usage of all the energy resources in the network and minimize the utility company’s long-term time averaged expected total cost of
supporting all users’ load demands.
Moreover, we study two cases of users’ load demands: frst, users have delay intolerant
(DI) load demands which need to be satisfed in the same time slot when they are requested,
and second, users have both DI and delay tolerant (DT) load demands, the latter of which
can tolerate being served within user-defned deadlines. In each case, we frst formulate an
optimization problem, which turns out to be a time-coupling problem. Previous approaches
usually solve such problems based on Dynamic Programming [24, 41] and suffer from the
“curse of dimensionality” problem [6]. They also require full statistical information of the
random variables in the problem, which may be diffcult to obtain in practice. Instead, we
reformulate the problem using Lyapunov optimization theory for event-driven queueing
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systems [36]. We develop a dynamic energy management scheme that can dynamically
solve the problem in each time slot based on the current system state only, i.e., without
any information about the future or past system states, and hence is more effcient than
previous approaches. With the results of our dynamic energy management scheme, we are
then able to obtain both a lower and an upper bound on the optimal result of the original
optimization problem. Furthermore, in the case of both DI and DT load demands, we also
show that DT load demands are guaranteed to be served within user-defned deadlines.
Extensive simulations have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed
dynamic energy management scheme. Results show that the proposed scheme can lead to
tight lower and upper bounds on the optimal result, and can signifcantly reduce the utility
company’s cost.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces system models
considered in this study. We study dynamic energy management with DI load demands in
Section 3.3 and with both DI and DT loads in Section 3.4. Simulations are conducted in
Section 3.5. We fnally conclude this chapter in Section 3.6.

3.2 System Model
In this section we describe the considered smart grid network and our mathematical
models for users’ delay intolerant load demand, distributed renewable energy generation,
distributed energy storage, load serving, and the utility company’s energy generation cost.
Note that we only introduce delay intolerant load demand model here. Delay tolerant load
demand model will be discussed in Section 3.4.
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3.2.1 Smart Grid Network
We consider an electric power distribution network consisting of a set of residential and
business energy users, denoted by I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, who have two-way real-time communications with a utility company. Each user has a renewable energy resource, an energy
storage device, and a connection to the power grid, which collaboratively satisfy its load
demand. The utility company provides energy to the users from both a traditional power
plant (e.g., coal, gas) and a renewable energy resource (e.g., solar bank, wind farm). It aims
to optimally schedule the usage of all the energy resources in the network and minimize
its total cost of supporting all users’ load demands. Besides, we consider that the system
works in a time-slotted fashion. Energy management decisions are made dynamically by
the utility company in each time slot. In particular, in each time slot, users transmit their
load requests along with other state variables to a control center deployed by the utility
company. Based on the collected data, the control center computes a load servicing schedule and transmits to each user his/her corresponding actions needed to be executed in the
current time slot. Each user then follows the instructions and updates some of his/her state
variables.

3.2.2 Delay Intolerant Load Demand Model
DI load demands are very common in our daily life, such as lighting and using electronic devices, and need to be satisfed in the same time slot. Denote user i’s delay intolerant (DI) load demand in time slot t by li (t). We assume {li (t)}∞
t=0 is an independent and
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identically distributed (i.i.d.) non-negative stochastic process, which is deterministically
bounded, i.e., 0 ≤ li (t) ≤ limax .

3.2.3 Distributed Renewable Energy Generation
Each user is equipped with a renewable energy resource, which can be a set of solar
panels or a wind turbine. The output of a renewable energy resource is dynamic and diffcult to predict because it depends on meteorological conditions. In this work, we assume
that the output of user i’s renewable energy resource, denoted by ei (t), is an i.i.d. stochastic process and satisfes 0 ≤ ei (t) ≤ emax
, where eimax is the maximum energy output of
i
user i’s renewable energy resource and a constant.
In addition to serving user i’s load, ei (t) can be used to charge the user’s energy storage
device, or sold to the power grid. In particular, we have
ei (t) = ril (t) + rig (t) + cir (t)

(3.1)

where ril (t) is the energy used to satisfy user i’s load demand li (t), rig (t) is the energy sold
to the grid, and cri (t) is the energy used to charge user i’s energy storage device.

3.2.4 Distributed Energy Storage
Each user i has an energy storage device which can store some energy that can be used
at a later time. Since the energy storage device acts as an energy buffer, we can model its
energy level as a queue, i.e.,
Bi (t + 1) = Bi (t) + Ci (t) − Di (t).
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(3.2)

In particular, Ci (t) is the energy charging the energy storage device, i.e.,
Ci (t) = cgi (t) + cri (t)

(3.3)

where cgi (t) and cri (t) are the energy drawn from the grid and from the renewable energy
resource, respectively. Di (t) is the energy discharged from the energy storage device, i.e.,
Di (t) = dgi (t) + dli (t)

(3.4)

where dgi (t) is the energy sold to the grid, and dli (t) is the energy serving user i’s DI load
demand.
Notice that it is more effcient to serve user i’s load demand li (t) by directly using
energy from the grid or from the renewable energy resource, than by frst charging the
energy storage device and then discharging it. Thus, we have the following two constraints
1dli (t)>0 + 1cri (t)>0 ≤ 1

(3.5)

1dli (t)>0 + 1cgi (t)>0 ≤ 1

(3.6)

where the indicator function 1A is equal to 1 when the event A is true, and zero otherwise.
On the other hand, it is more effcient to sell energy to the grid by directly selling the
output of the renewable energy resource, than by frst charging the energy storage device
and then discharging it. Thus, we have
1dgi (t)>0 + 1cri (t)>0 ≤ 1

(3.7)

Similarly, discharging the energy storage device to sell energy to the grid and charging it
by drawing energy from the grid cannot take place at the same time, i.e.,
1dgi (t)>0 + 1cgi (t)>0 ≤ 1
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(3.8)

The above constraints (3.5)-(3.8) will always hold when the following one holds:
1Ci (t)>0 + 1Di (t)>0 ≤ 1

(3.9)

Besides, denote by Bimax the maximum amount of energy that can be stored by user i’s
energy storage device. Then, we need
0 ≤ Bi (t) ≤ Bimax .

(3.10)

Denote by Cimax the maximum amount of energy that user i’s energy storage device can be
charged with during a single time slot, and Dimax the maximum amount of energy that can
be discharged from user i’s energy storage device during a single time slot. Thus, we have
Ci (t) ≤ min[Cimax , Bimax − Bi (t)]

(3.11)

Di (t) ≤ min[Dimax , Bi (t)].

(3.12)

From (3.11) and (3.12), we get Ci (t) + Di (t) ≤ Bimax − Bi (t) + Bi (t) = Bimax , which
should hold for any Ci (t) and Di (t) that satisfy (3.11) and (3.12). Since Ci (t) ≤ Cimax and
Di (t) ≤ Dimax , we also have the following constraint:
Cimax + Dimax ≤ Bimax .

(3.13)

3.2.5 Load Serving
The utility company needs to supply enough energy to the grid to satisfy all users’ load
demands. The amount of energy supplied by the utility company in time slot t, denoted by
P (t), can be calculated as
P (t) =

X�
i∈I


li (t) + cgi (t) − ril (t) − rig (t) − dig (t) − dil (t) .
44

(3.14)

User i’s load demand is satisfed by the energy from the power grid, its local renewable
energy resource, and its own energy storage device. Particularly, we have
li (t) = gil (t) + ril (t) + dli (t)

(3.15)

where gil (t) is the amount of energy drawn from the power grid to satisfy user i’s load
demand in time slot t. Note that user i’s connection to the power grid can only be in one
of three states: drawing energy from the grid, providing energy to the grid, and idle, i.e.,
cannot draw and provide energy at the same time. Therefore, we get
1gil (t)+cgi (t)>0 + 1dgi (t)+rig (t)>0 ≤ 1.

(3.16)

In addition, the total amount of energy that user i draws from the power grid in time
slot t, denoted by Gi (t), satisfes
0 ≤ Gi (t) = gil (t) + cig (t)c ≤ Gimax

(3.17)

is a constant determined by the physical characteristics of user i’s connection
where Gmax
i
to the grid. Similarly, the total amount of energy that user i provides to the power grid in
time slot t, denoted by Mi (t), satisfes
0 ≤ Mi (t) = rig (t) + dig (t) ≤ Mimax

(3.18)

where Mimax is also a constant.

3.2.6 Energy Generation Cost
As mentioned before, the utility company provides energy to the users from both a
traditional power plant and a renewable energy resource. Assume the output of the utility
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company’s renewable energy resource, denoted by R(t), is an i.i.d. non-negative stochastic
process. The cost of generating such renewable energy is considered to be negligible. Thus,
the utility company will frst use renewable energy and then traditional energy to satisfy
users’ load demands. The amount of traditional energy the utility company needs in time
slot t, denoted by N (t), is
N (t) = P (t) − R(t)

(3.19)

If R(t) > P (t), then the utility company is able to sell the excess power to other utility
companies.
Consequently, a utility company’s energy generation cost can be calculated as
U (t) = f (N (t))

(3.20)

where f (N (t)) is a non-decreasing and convex function1 .

3.3 Dynamic Energy Management with Delay Intolerant Load Demands
In this section, we study the dynamic energy management for the smart grid when users
have delay intolerant (DI) load demands.

3.3.1 Problem Formulation
Let H(t) = {H1 (t), H2 (t), . . . , Hn (t)} be the vector of decision variables in the system, where Hi (t) = {gil (t), dgi (t), dli (t), cri (t), cgi (t), rig (t), ril (t)}. We also denote the system state by a vector of random variables, i.e., S(t) = {S1 (t), S2 (t), . . . , Sn (t), R(t)}
1

Note that our analysis herein still holds if we assume a concave cost function f . In that case, our
objective function can be set to max{−f (N (t))}
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where Si (t) = {li (t), ei (t)}. Thus, the utility company’s objective is to design a dynamic energy management algorithm, which can optimally control the decision vectors
H(t) (t ≥ 0) to minimize the following long-term time averaged expected total cost, i.e.,
T −1
1X
U = lim
E{U (t)},
T →∞ T
t=0

(3.21)

under uncertain system states S(t) (t ≥ 0)2 . We call this problem P1 and formally formulate it as follows:
P1 : Minimize

U

(3.22)

We denote the optimal result, i.e., the minimum of the objective function, of P1 by P1∗ .
We can see that P1 is a time-coupling optimization problem due to constraints (3.2),
(3.10)-(3.12). Previous approaches usually solve such problems based on Dynamic Programming and suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” problem [6]. They also require
detailed statistical information of the random variables in the problem, which may be diffcult to obtain in practice. Next, we reformulate this problem using Lyapunov optimization
theory for queueing systems [36] so that it can be solved in each time slot based on the
current system state only.

3.3.2

Dynamic Energy Management Using Lyapunov Optimization

In order to better control users’ energy storage devices, we defne a shifted energy level
Xi (t) for user i’s energy storage device in time slot t as follows:
Xi (t) = Bi (t) − V β max − Dimax
2

(3.23)

Note that we use x̄ to denote the long-term time averaged expected value of a stochastic process x(t) in
this study.
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where β max is the maximum frst-order derivative of U (t) with respect to N (t), and V is
a positive constant to be defned later. We also denote by β min the minimum frst-order
derivative of U (t) with respect to N (t).
Thus, according to (3.2), Xi (t) is updated by the following queueing rule:
Xi (t + 1) = Xi (t) + Ci (t) − Di (t).

(3.24)

Consequently, we can defne a Lyapunov function [36] as
L(X(t)) =

1X
(Xi (t))2 .
2 i∈I

(3.25)

where X(t) = {X1 (t), . . . , Xn (t)}. This function represents a scalar measure of stored
energy in the system. L(X(t)) being small implies that all stored energy levels are low,
while L(X(t)) being large implies that at least one stored energy level is high. Besides,
the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift can be defned as
(X(t)) = E{L(X(t + 1)) − L(X(t))|X(t)}

(3.26)

Since our objective is to minimize the long-term time averaged expected total cost of the
utility company, instead of taking a control action to minimize (X(t)), we minimize the
following drift-plus-penalty function:
(X(t)) + V E{U (t)|X(t)}.
We can have the following lemma.
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(3.27)

3.3.2.1

Lemma 1

Given (X(t)) defned in (3.26), we have
(t) + V E{U (t)|X(t)}
≤A + V E{U (t)|X(t)} +

X

Xi (t)E{Ci (t) − Di (t)|X(t)}

(3.28)

i∈I

where A is a constant, i.e.,
A=

X
i∈I

!
max[(Cimax )2 , (Dimax )2 ]
.
2

(3.29)

Proof: Squaring both sides of (3.24), we get
Xi2 (t + 1) − Xi2 (t)
2
(Ci (t) − Di (t))2
=
+ Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t))
2
max[(Cimax )2 , (Dimax )2 ]
≤
+ Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t)).
2

(3.30)

Thus, we can obtain that
(t) + V E{U (t)|X(t)}
X
max[(Cimax )2 , (Dimax )2 ]
≤ V E{U (t)|X(t)} + E
2
i∈I


+Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t)) |X(t) ,

(3.31)

and (3.28) directly follows.
Our objective is to minimize the right-hand side of (3.28) in each time slot t given the
current stored energy levels X(t) and system state S(t). Since A is a constant, we aim to
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minimize V U (t) +

P

i∈I

Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t)). Moreover, recall that in P1, constraints

(3.2), (3.10)-(3.12) couple the energy levels of users’ energy storage devices among all the
time slots. We can break this coupling by leaving (3.2), (3.10) out, and relaxing (3.11),
(3.12) into two constraints as follows:
0 ≤ Ci (t) ≤ Cimax

(3.32)

0 ≤ Di (t) ≤ Dimax .

(3.33)

Therefore, we can formulate a relaxed optimization problem called P2 in the following:
P2: Minimize

V U (t) +

X

Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t))

(3.34)

i∈I

s.t.

(3.1), (3.3), (3.4), (3.9), (3.13) − (3.20), (3.32), (3.33)

Our dynamic energy management is carried out as follows. The utility company solves
the problem P2 in each time slot t given X(t) and S(t) collected from the users. It then
sends the obtained control decisions to the users, who follow the instructions and update
their stored energy levels X(t) according to (3.24) and (3.2). We denote the corresponding
long-term time averaged expected total cost, i.e., U , by P2∗ .

3.3.2.2

Theorem 1

Defne the maximum value of V as
V max = min
i∈I

Bimax − Cimax − Dimax
.
β max − β min

(3.35)

For 0 ≤ Bi (0) ≤ Bimax for all i ∈ I and any 0 ≤ V ≤ V max , our dynamic energy
management scheme has the following properties:
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1. An arbitrary user i’s stored energy level Bi (t) satisfes the constraint (3.10), i.e.,
0 ≤ Bi (t) ≤ Bimax , for all t ≥ 0, and is strongly stable.
2. The obtained control decisions are feasible solutions to P1.
3.
P2∗ − A/V ≤ P1∗ ≤ P2∗ .

(3.36)

Proof:
a) We prove 1. by induction. Particularly, assume that for an arbitrary user i, (3.10)
holds in time slot t. Then, we consider the following cases to prove that (3.10) also holds
in time slot t + 1.
First, 0 ≤ Bi (t) < Dimax . Recall that Ci (t) = cgi (t) + cri (t). In this case, the partial
derivative of the objective function of P2, denoted by P 2(t), with respect to cgi (t), is
∂P 2(t)
∂U (t)
= V g
+ Xi (t)
g
∂ci (t)
∂ci (t)
≤ V β max + Bi (t) − V β max − Dimax
< 0.

(3.37)

Similarly, we can have
∂P 2(t)
= Xi (t) < −V β max < 0.
∂cri (t)

(3.38)

Thus, by solving P2, i.e., minimizing P 2(t), our energy management scheme leads to
control decisions that satisfy Ci (t) = cri (t) + cgi (t) = Cimax . Due to constraint (3.9), we
have Di (t) = 0. Therefore, according to (3.2), we get Bi (t + 1) = Bi (t) + Cimax and hence
0 ≤ Bi (t + 1) ≤ Dimax + Cimax ≤ Bimax
due to constraint (3.13).
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(3.39)

Second, Dimax ≤ Bi (t) ≤ V (β max − β min ) + Dimax . Since
V ≤ V max ≤

Bimax − Cimax − Dimax
,
β max − β min

(3.40)

we have Bi (t) ≤ Bimax − Cimax . Thus, according to (3.2), we can obtain
Bi (t + 1) ≤ Bimax − Cimax + Ci (t) − Di (t) ≤ Bimax

(3.41)

Bi (t + 1) ≥ Dimax + Ci (t) − Di (t) ≥ 0.

(3.42)

and

Third, V (β max − β min ) + Dmax < Bi (t) ≤ Bimax . Note that V ≤

Bimax −Cimax −Dimax
,
β max −β min

and hence V (β max − β min ) + Dmax ≤ Bimax − Cimax < Bimax . The partial derivative of
the objective function of P2 with respect to dgi (t) is
∂P 2(t)
∂U (t)
= −V g
− Xi (t)
g
∂di (t)
∂di (t)
≤ −V β min − Bi (t) + V β max + Dimax
< 0.

(3.43)

Similarly, we can also get that ∂P 2(t)/∂dli (t) < 0. Thus, our energy management scheme
minimizing P 2(t) results in control decisions that satisfy Di (t) = dgi (t) + dli (t) = Dimax .
Due to constraint (3.9), we have Ci (t) = 0. Thus, according to (3.2), we get Bi (t + 1) =
Bi (t) − Dimax and hence
0 ≤ Bi (t + 1) ≤ Bimax − Dimax ≤ Bimax .
Therefore, we can see that (3.10) holds for all t ≥ 0.
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(3.44)

b) We have known from 1) that constraint (3.10) holds. Besides, according to (3.2), we
have Ci (t) = Bi (t + 1) − Bi (t) + Di (t) ≤ Bimax − Bi (t) + Di (t). Due to constraint (3.9),
we have that Di (t) = 0 when Ci (t) > 0. Thus, we get Ci (t) ≤ Bimax −Bi (t). Furthermore,
we have Bi (t + 1) = Bi (t) + Ci (t) − Di (t) ≥ 0, which leads to Di (t) ≤ Bi (t) + Ci (t).
Similarly, since Ci (t) = 0 when Di (t) > 0, we get Di (t) ≤ Bi (t). Therefore, both (3.11)
and (3.12) hold as well. In addition, our dynamic energy management scheme updates the
stored energy levels X(t) according to (3.24), which means (3.24) holds too. As a result,
the control decisions obtained by our dynamic energy management scheme satisfy all the
constraints of P1, and hence are feasible solutions to P1.
b (t) the results obtained by our dynamic energy manci (t), and U
c) Denote by Cbi (t), D

agement scheme in time slot t, i.e., based on the optimal solution to P2. We also denote by

Ci∗ (t), Di∗ (t), and U ∗ (t) the results that we get for time slot t based on the optimal solution
to P1. Thus, from Lemma 1 in Section 3.3.2.1, we can have
b (t)|X(t)}
(t) + V E{U

b (t)|X(t)} +
≤A + V E{U
∗

X
i∈I

≤A + V E{U (t)|X(t)} +
∗

=A + V E{U (t)} +

X

ci (t)|X(t)}
Xi (t)E{Cbi (t) − D

X

Xi (t)E{Ci∗ (t) − Di∗ (t)|X(t)}

i∈I

Xi (t)E{Ci∗ (t) − Di∗ (t)}

(3.45)

i∈I

Note that the last step is due to the fact that the optimal solutions to P1 are obtained
independent of the current stored energy levels.
Besides, since the system state S(t) is i.i.d., it follows that Ci∗ (t) and Di∗ (t) are also i.i.d.
stochastic processes. Recall the strong law of large numbers: If {a(t)}∞
t=0 are i.i.d. random
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variables, we have Pr( T1 limT →∞
we get

PT −1
t=0

a(t) = E{a(t)}) = 1 almost surely. Consequently,

b (t)|X(t)}
E{L(X(t + 1)) − L(X(t))|X(t)} + V E{U
∗

≤A + V E{U (t)} +

X
i∈I

T −1
1X ∗
Xi (t) lim
(Ci (t) − Di∗ (t))
T →∞ T
t=0

(3.46)

Taking expectation of the above inequality, we get
b (t)}
E{L(X(t + 1))} − E{L(X(t))} + V E{U

≤A + V E{U ∗ (t)}

T −1
1X
+
E{Xi (t)} lim
E{Ci∗ (t) − Di∗ (t)}
T →∞ T
t=0
i∈I
X
=A + V E{U ∗ (t)} +
E{Xi (t)}(Ci∗ − Di∗ ).

X

(3.47)

i∈I

In addition, summing (3.2) over all the time slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1} and taking
expectation on both sides, we have
E{Bi (T )} − E{Bi (0)} =

T −1
X

E{Ci∗ (t) − Di∗ (t)}

(3.48)

t=0

Dividing the above equation by T and taking limits as T → ∞, we get Ci∗ − Di∗ = 0.
Therefore, we can obtain
b (t)}
E{L(X(t + 1))} − E{L(X(t))} + V E{U

≤ A + V E{U ∗ (t)}.

(3.49)

Summing the above inequality over all the time slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1}, we get
T −1
X
t=0

b (t)} ≤ AT + V
V E{U

T −1
X

E{U ∗ (t)} − E{L(X(T ))}

t=0

+E{L(X(0))}
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(3.50)

Since 0 ≤ Bi (t) ≤ Bimax for all t ≥ 0, Xi (t) is fnite in all time slots as well. Then,
dividing both sides of the above equality by V T and taking limits as T → ∞, we can
obtain
T −1
T −1
1X b
1X
A
lim
E{U (t)} ≤ lim
E{U ∗ (t)} + ,
T →∞ T
T →∞ T
V
t=0
t=0

(3.51)

which means P1∗ ≥ P2∗ − A/V .

Besides, as shown in b), the optimal solutions to P2 are also a feasible solution to P1.
Thus, the value of the objective function of P1 calculated based on the optimal solution to
P2, i.e., P2∗ , is an upper bound on P1∗ , i.e, P1∗ ≤ P2∗ .
We have now fnished the proof.

3.4 Dynamic Energy Management with Mixed Load Demands
In this section, we extend the basic system model described in Section 3.2 to the case
that users have both delay intolerant (DI) and delay tolerant (DT) load demands. In particular, the same as before, DI load demands need to be satisfed in the same time slots when
they are requested without any delay. In contrast, DT load demands just need to be served
before some user-defned deadlines. Examples for DT load demands are washer/dryer machines, dishwashers, etc.

3.4.1 Mixed Load Demand Model
Consider that an arbitrary user i has both DI and DT load demands. DI load demands
are modeled in the same way as described in Section 3.2.2. We denote user i’s DT load
demand in time slot t by Ti (t). We also assume that {Ti (t)}∞
t=0 is an i.i.d. non-negative
stochastic process, and 0 ≤ Ti (t) ≤ Timax for all t ≥ 0. Besides, we assume Timax ≤ Gimax .
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It means that the DT load demand that a user can have in one slot is no larger than the
maximum amount of energy it can draw from the power grid, which is reasonable.
User i’s DT demand is placed in a local queue Qi (t), which is updated as follows:
Qi (t + 1) = max[Qi (t) − yi (t), 0] + Ti (t)

(3.52)

where yi (t) = dqi (t) + giq (t) + riq (t) is the amount of service received by the queue. Particularly, dqi (t), giq (t), and riq (t) are the energy drawn from user i’s energy storage device,
the power grid, and user i’s renewable energy resource in time slot t to support user i’s DT
demand, respectively.
Due to the introduction of DT load demands, constraint (3.1) changes into:
ei (t) = ril (t) + riq (t) + rig (t) + cri (t).

(3.53)

Ci (t) remains the same, while Di (t) changes from (3.4) into:
Di (t) = dgi (t) + dli (t) + dqi (t).

(3.54)

Mi (t) remains the same, while Gi (t) changes from (3.17) into:
0 ≤ Gi (t) = gil (t) + giq (t) + cig (t) ≤ Gimax ,

(3.55)

and (3.16) changes into
1gil (t)+cgi (t)+giq (t)>0 + 1dgi (t)+rig (t)>0 ≤ 1.

(3.56)

Besides, the amount of energy supplied by the utility company in time slot t changes from
(3.14) into
P (t) =

X�

li (t) + giq (t) + cig (t) − ril (t) − rig (t) − dig (t) − dil (t) .
i∈I
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(3.57)

3.4.2 Problem Formulation with Mixed Load Demand Model
Let H(t) = {H1 (t), H2 (t), . . . , Hn (t)} be the vector of decision variables in the system, where Hi (t) = {gil (t), giq (t), dgi (t), dli (t), dqi (t), cri (t), cig (t), rig (t), ril (t), riq (t)}. We
also denote the system state by a vector of random variables, i.e., S(t) = {S1 (t), S2 (t), . . . ,
Sn (t), R(t)} where Si (t) = {li (t), Ti (t), ei (t)}. Thus, the dynamic energy management
problem with mixed load demand model, which we call P3, can be formulated as follows:

P3:

Minimize

(3.58)

U

s.t. DT loads are served before user-defned deadlines
Constraints: (3.2), (3.3), (3.9) − (3.13), (3.15), (3.18) − (3.20),
(3.53) − (3.57), ∀t ≥ 0
We denote the optimal result, i.e., the minimum of the objective function, of P3 by P3∗ .
We notice that P3 is also a time-coupling optimization problem, which is prohibitively
diffcult to solve as explained in Section 3.3.1. Similarly, in what follows we reformulate
this problem based on Lyapunov optimization theory such that it can be solved based on
current system state only.

3.4.3 Delay Aware Virtual Queue
In order to characterize the delay in serving users’ DT load demand, we defne a delayaware virtual queue Zi (t) for each user i, whose queueing function is as follows:
Zi (t + 1) = max[Zi (t) − yi (t), 0] + ǫi 1Qi (t)>0 .
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(3.59)

In particular, Zi (t) has the same serving rate as Qi (t), but a different arrival rate. ǫi is a
constant related to user-defned service deadline, which will be specifed in Lemma 2 in
, i.e., the arriving rate is no larger than the
Section 3.4.3.1. We also assume that ǫi ≤ Gmax
i
maximum amount of energy user i can draw from the power grid. We have the following
lemma.

3.4.3.1

Lemma 2

Assume that the queues Q(t) and Z(t) are controlled in such a way that Qi (t) < Qmax
i
and Zi (t) < Zimax for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I, where Zimax and Qmax
are deterministic
i
positive constants. Then, an arbitrary user i’s DT load demand Ti (t) can be served within
a maximum delay of
µimax = ⌈

+ Zimax
Qmax
i
⌉.
ǫi

(3.60)

Proof: In what follows, we prove (3.60) by contradiction.
Assume that the delay in serving an arbitrary user i’s DT demand is larger than µmax
.
i
Suppose Ti (t) > 0 in time slot t. Thus, we have Q(t + 1) > 0 according to (3.52), and
Q(τ ) > 0 for t + 1 ≤ τ ≤ t + µmax
. Referring to (3.59), we get
i
Zi (τ + 1) ≥ Zi (τ ) − yi (τ ) + ǫi

(3.61)

for t + 1 ≤ τ ≤ t + µmax
. Summing over the time slots from t + 1 to t + µmax
yields
i
i
t+µmax
i

Zi (t + µmax
+ 1) − Zi (t + 1) ≥ µmax
ǫi −
i
i

X

τ =t+1
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yi (τ )

(3.62)

Since Z(t + µmax
+ 1) ≤ Zmax and Z(t + 1) ≥ 0, we can get
i
t+µmax
i

X

yi (t) ≥ µmax
ǫi − Zimax
i

(3.63)

t+1

Consider that the DT loads are served in a frst in frst out (FIFO) manner. Since Qi (t +
1) < Qmax
and user i’s DT demand Ti (t) has not been served by t + µimax , we have
i
Pt+µmax
i
τ =t+1

yi (t) < Qmax
. Thus, from (3.63) we can get
i
Qmax
+ Zimax > µimax ǫi .
i

Since µmax
=⌈
i

Qmax
+Zimax
i
⌉,
ǫi

(3.64)

we have Qimax + Zimax > Qimax + Zimax , which is impossible.

Thus, the assumption that the delay in serving an arbitrary user i’s DT demand is larger
than µmax
is invalid, and Lemma 2 in Section 3.4.3.1 follows.
i
and
According to Lemma 2 in Section 3.4.3.1, each user i can set ǫi based on Qmax
i
Zimax to make sure that its DT load demand can be satisfed by a certain deadline. We
and Zimax in detail later. We are now ready to present our Lyapunov
will describe Qmax
i
optimization based energy management scheme.

3.4.4 Dynamic Energy Management based on Lyapunov Optimization
Notice that the queues that are maintained in the system can be denoted by a vector
(t) = {X(t), Q(t), Z(t)}. Thus, we can defne a Lyapunov function as
L((t)) =


1 X�
(Xi (t))2 + (Qi (t))2 + (Zi (t))2 ,
2 i∈I

(3.65)

and the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift is
((t)) = E{L((t + 1)) − L((t))|(t)}.
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(3.66)

Recall that yi (t) = dqi (t) + giq (t) + riq (t). Since 0 ≤ diq (t) ≤ Dimax , 0 ≤ giq (t) ≤ Gmax
,
i
+ emax
. We denote
and 0 ≤ riq (t) ≤ ei (t) ≤ emax
, we have 0 ≤ yi (t) ≤ Dimax + Gmax
i
i
i
the upper bound on yi (t) as yimax . Then, we can have the following lemma regarding the
drift-plus-penalty function.

3.4.4.1

Lemma 3

Given ((t)) defned in (3.66), we have
((t))+V E{U (t)|(t)}
≤ K + V E{U (t)|(t)}
+

X

Xi (t)E{Ci (t) − Di (t)|(t)}

i∈I

+

X

(3.67)

Qi (t)E{Ti (t) − yi (t)|(t)}

i∈I

+

X

Zi (t)E{ǫi − yi (t)|(t)}

i∈I

where K is a constant, i.e.,
K=

X  max[(C max )2 , (Dmax )2 ]
i

i

2

i∈I

+

ǫ2i

+

+

(Timax )2 + (yimax )2
2

(yimax )2 
2

(3.68)

.

Proof: We have obtained in Lemma 1 in Section 3.3.2.1 that
Xi2 (t + 1) − Xi2 (t)
2
max 2
max[(Ci ) , (Dimax )2 ]
≤
+ Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t)).
2
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(3.69)

Besides, note that ∀x, y, z with x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ y ≤ ymax , 0 ≤ z ≤ zmax , we have
(max{x − y, 0} + z)2 ≤ x2 + y 2 + z 2 + 2x(z − y)
(3.70)
2

≤x +

2
ymax

+

2
zmax

+ 2x(z − y).

Thus, squaring both sides of (3.52), we get
Qi (t + 1)2 − Qi (t)2
2
max 2
) + (yimax )2
(T
≤ i
+ Qi (t) (Ti (t) − yi (t))
2

(3.71)

Similarly, squaring both sides of (3.59), we have
Zi (t + 1)2 − Zi (t)2
ǫ2 + (yimax )2
≤ i
+ Zi (t)(ǫi − yi (t)).
2
2

(3.72)

Therefore, summing (3.69), (3.71), and (3.72) over all i ∈ I, taking expectations conditioned on (t), and adding the cost function V E{U (t)|(t)}, we arrive at Lemma 3 in
Section 3.4.4.1.
Similar to that in Section 3.3.2, we aim to minimize the right-hand side of (3.67) in
each time slots t based on current system state. Note that in (3.67) Ti (t) is a constant
given the current system state, and ǫi is a constant, too. Thus, removing the constants and
relaxing the constraints (3.2), (3.10)-(3.12), we formulate a new problem P4 as follows:
V U (t) +
P4: Minimize

X

Xi (t)(Ci (t) − Di (t))

i∈I

− (Qi (t) + Zi (t))yi (t)
s.t.



Constraints: (3.3), (3.9), (3.13), (3.15), (3.18) − (3.20),

(3.32), (3.33), (3.53) − (3.57)
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(3.73)

Our dynamic energy management scheme works as follows. The utility company solves
the problem P4 in each time slot t given (t) and S(t) collected from the users. It then
sends the obtained control decisions to the users, who follow the instructions and update
their queues X(t), Q(t), and Z(t) in the system according to (3.24) and (3.2), (3.52), and
(3.59), respectively. We denote the corresponding long-term time averaged expected total
cost, i.e., U , by P4∗ .

3.4.4.2

Theorem 2

Defne the maximum value of V as
V max = min
i∈I

where Ni =

Bimax − Cimax − Dimax − Ni
.
β max

4Bimax −4Cimax −2Dimax +3Timax +3ǫi
.
7

(3.74)

Assume Bimax ≫ Cimax + Dimax + Timax + ǫi .

Suppose all DT load demand queues and virtual queues start with zero backlogs, i.e.,
Qi (0) = Zi (0) = 0 for all i ∈ I, and all energy storage devices start with feasible energy
levels, i.e., 0 ≤ Bi (0) ≤ Bimax for all i ∈ I. Then, for any 0 ≤ V ≤ V max , our dynamic
energy management scheme has the following properties:
1. For an arbitrary user i, its queues Qi (t) and Zi (t) are deterministically upper bounded
by constants Qmax
and Zimax , respectively, for all t ≥ 0 where
i
2V β max + Dimax
+ Timax
3
2V β max + Dimax
=
+ ǫi
3

Qmax
=
i

(3.75)

Zimax

(3.76)

2. For an arbitrary user i, its stored energy level Bi (t) satisfes (3.10), i.e., 0 ≤ Bi (t) ≤
Bimax for all t ≥ 0.
3. For an arbitrary user i, its DT load demand can be served with a maximum delay of
µimax = ⌈

4V β max + 2Dimax + 3Timax + 3ǫi
⌉.
3ǫi
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(3.77)

4. The obtained control solutions are feasible solutions to P3.
5.
P4∗ − K/V ≤ P3∗ ≤ P4∗ .

(3.78)

Proof:
a) We frst prove (3.75) by induction. Obviously, (3.75) holds for t = 0. Assume that
(3.75) holds in time slot t. In the following, we show that (3.75) also holds in time slot
t + 1.
First, 0 ≤ Qi (t) ≤

2V β max +Dimax
.
3

Since Ti (t) ≤ Timax , then according to (3.52), we

have
Qi (t + 1) ≤ max[Qi (t) − yi (t) + Timax , Timax ].
Thus, we get Qi (t + 1) ≤ Qi (t) + Timax ≤
Second,

2V β max +Dimax
3

< Qi (t) ≤

2V β max +Dimax
3

2V β max +Dimax
3

(3.79)

+ Timax .

+ Timax . In this case, the partial deriva-

tive of the objective function of P4, denoted by P 4(t), with respect to giq (t), is
∂P 4(t)
∂U (t)
= V q
− (Qi (t) + Zi (t))
q
∂gi (t)
∂gi (t)
≤ V β max − (Qi (t) + Zi (t)).

(3.80)

Similarly, we can have
∂P 4(t)
= −(Qi (t) + Zi (t)),
∂riq (t)
∂P 4(t)
= −(Xi (t) + Qi (t) + Zi (t)).
∂dqi (t)
Since Xi (t) ≥ −V β max − Dimax and Qi (t) >

2V β max +Dimax
,
3

(3.81)
(3.82)

we get

∂P 4(t) ∂P 4(t) ∂P 4(t)
+
+
∂riq (t)
∂dqi (t)
∂giq (t)
≤ V β max − Xi (t) − 3Qi (t) − 3Zi (t) < 0.
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(3.83)

Thus, our dynamic energy scheme that minimizes P 4(t) will choose yi (t) to be its maximum value. Since yi (t) = dqi (t) + giq (t) + riq (t) where diq (t) ≤ Dimax , giq (t) ≤ Gmax
, and
i
riq (t) ≤ ei (t), the maximum of yi (t), denoted by yimax (t), is yimax (t) = Dimax + Gmax
+
i
ei (t).
• If Qi (t) ≥ yimax (t), we have Qi (t + 1) = Qi (t) − yimax (t) + Ti (t). Since Ti (t) ≤
2V β max +Dimax
Timax ≤ Gimax , we get Ti (t) ≤ yimax (t) and hence Qi (t+1) ≤ Qi (t) ≤
+
3
max
Ti .
• If Qi (t) < yimax (t), we have Qi (t + 1) = Ti (t) ≤ Timax ≤

2V β max +Dimax
3

+ Timax .

As a result, (3.75) holds for all t ≥ 0.
Next, we prove (3.76) by induction. Note that (3.76) holds for t = 0. Assume that
(3.76) holds in time slot t. In what follows, we show that (3.76) also holds in time slot
t + 1.
First, 0 ≤ Zi (t) ≤

2V β max +Dimax
.
3

According to (3.59), we have Zi (t+1) ≤ max[Zi (t)−

yi (t) + ǫi , ǫi ]. Thus, we get Zi (t + 1) ≤ Zi (t) + ǫi ≤
Second,

2V β max +Dimax
3

< Zi (t) ≤

2V β max +Dimax
3

2V β max +Dimax
3

+ ǫi .

+ ǫi . From (3.80)-(3.82), we can have

∂P 4(t) ∂P 4(t) ∂P 4(t)
+
+
∂riq (t)
∂dqi (t)
∂giq (t)
≤ V β max − Xi (t) − 3Qi (t) − 3Zi (t)
≤ 2V β max + Dimax − 3Zi (t)
< 0

(3.84)

due to Xi (t) ≥ −V β max − Dimax and Qi (t) ≥ 0. Thus, our dynamic energy scheme
minimizing P 4(t) will choose yi (t) = yimax (t) = Dimax + Gmax
+ ei (t) as shown above.
i
• If Zi (t) ≥ yimax (t), we have Zi (t + 1) ≤ Zi (t) − yimax (t) + ǫi . Since ǫi ≤ Gimax , we
2V β max +Dimax
+ ǫi .
get Ti (t + 1) ≤ Zi (t) ≤
3
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• If Qi (t) < yimax (t), we have Zi (t + 1) = ǫi ≤

2V β max +Dimax
3

+ ǫi .

Therefore, (3.76) holds for all t ≥ 0.
b) We prove 2. by induction. Assume that for an arbitrary user i, (3.10) holds in time
slot t. Then, we consider the following cases to prove that (3.10) also holds in time slot
t + 1.
First, 0 ≤ Bi (t) < Dimax . This case is identical to the frst case of Theorem 1a in
Section 3.3.2.2. Thus, our energy management scheme takes control decisions cri and cgi ,
such that Ci (t) = cri (t) + cgi (t) = Cimax . Due to constraint (3.9), we also have Di (t) = 0.
Thus, according to (3.2), we get Bi (t + 1) = Bi (t) + Cimax and
0 ≤ Bi (t + 1) ≤ Dimax + Cimax ≤ Bimax

(3.85)

due to constraint (3.13).
Second, Dimax ≤ Bi (t) ≤ V β max + Dimax + Qmax
+ Zimax . Since
i
V ≤ V max ≤

Bimax − Cimax − Dimax − Ni
,
β max

(3.86)

according to (3.75) and (3.76), we have
Bi (t)
≤Bimax − Cimax +

4V β max + 2Dimax + 3Timax + 3ǫi
− Ni
3

≤Bimax − Cimax +
4Bimax − 4Cimax − 2Dimax + 3Timax + 3ǫi − 7Ni
3
=Bimax − Cimax .

(3.87)
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Thus, according to (3.2), we can obtain
Bi (t + 1) ≤ Bimax − Cimax + Ci (t) − Di (t) ≤ Bimax

(3.88)

Bi (t + 1) ≥ Dimax + Ci (t) − Di (t) ≥ 0.

(3.89)

and

Third, V β max + Dimax + Qmax
+ Zimax < Bi (t) ≤ Bimax . Note that we have shown
i
above that V β max +Dimax +Qimax +Zimax ≤ Bimax −Cimax < Bimax . The partial derivative
of the objective function of P4 with respect to dgi (t) is
∂P 4(t)
∂U (t)
= −V g
− Xi (t)
g
∂di (t)
∂di (t)
≤ −V β min − Bi (t) + V β max + Dimax
≤ −V β min − Qmax
− Zimax
i
< 0.

(3.90)

Similarly, we can also get that ∂P 4(t)/∂dli (t) < 0. The partial derivative of the objective
function of P4 with respect to dqi (t) is
∂P 4(t)
= −(Xi (t) + Qi (t) + Zi (t))
∂dqi (t)
= −Bi (t) + V β max + Dimax − Qi (t) − Zi (t)
≤ −V β max − Dimax − Qimax − Zimax
+V β max + Dimax − Qi (t) − Zi (t)
< 0.

(3.91)
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After minimizing P 4(t), our energy management scheme results in control decisions that
satisfy Di (t) = dgi (t) + dil (t) + diq (t) = Dimax . Due to constraint (3.9), we have Ci (t) = 0.
Thus, according to (3.2), we get Bi (t + 1) = Bi (t) − Dimax and hence
0 ≤ Bi (t + 1) ≤ Bimax − Dimax ≤ Bimax .

(3.92)

Therefore, we can see that (3.10) holds for all t ≥ 0.
c) The result (3.77) directly follows Lemma 2 in Section 3.4.3.1.
d) Part a) has shown that constraint (3.10) holds. The same as Theorem 1b in Section
3.3.2.2, we can show that (3.32) and (3.33) hold. Part b) of this theorem has shown that
DT load demands can be served before user-defned deadlines. Thus, the control decisions
obtained by our dynamic energy management scheme satisfy all the constraints of P3, and
hence are feasible solutions to P3.
b (t) the results obtained by our dynamic energy
ci (t), ybi (t), and U
e) Denote by Cbi (t), D

management scheme in time slot t, i.e., based on the optimal solution to P4. We also
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denote by Ci∗ (t), Di∗ (t), yi∗ (t), and U ∗ (t) the results that we get for time slot t based on the
optimal solution to P3. Thus, from Lemma 3 in Section 3.4.4.1, we can have
b (t)|(t)}
(t) + V E{U

b (t)|(t)}
≤ K + V E{U
+

X
i∈I

+

X
i∈I

+

X
i∈I

ci (t)|(t)}
Xi (t)E{Cbi (t) − D

Qi (t)E{Ti (t) − ybi (t)|(t)}

Zi (t)E{ǫi − ybi (t)|(t)}

≤ K + V E{U ∗ (t)}
+

X

Xi (t)E{Ci∗ (t) − Di∗ (t)}

i∈I

+

X

Qi (t)E{Ti (t) − yi∗ (t)}

i∈I

+

X

Zi (t)E{ǫi − yi∗ (t)}

(3.93)

i∈I

Note that the second step is based on the fact that the optimal solutions to P3 are obtained
independent of the queue state (t).
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Besides, since the system state S(t) is i.i.d., Ci∗ (t), Di∗ (t), and yi∗ (t) are also i.i.d.
stochastic processes. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1c in Section 3.3.2.2, applying the
strong law of large numbers and taking expectation of both sides, we get
b (t)}
E{L((t + 1))} − E{L((t))} + V E{U

≤K + V E{U ∗ (t)}

T −1
X
1X
∗
∗
+
E{Xi (t)} · lim
E{Ci (t) − Di (t)}
T →∞ T
t=0
i∈I

T −1
X
1X
∗
+
E{Qi (t)} · lim
E{Ti (t) − yi (t)}
T →∞ T
t=0
i∈I


T
−1
X
1X
∗
+
E{Zi (t)} · lim
E{ǫi − yi (t)}
T →∞ T
t=0
i∈I
We have shown by (3.48) that limT →∞

1
T

PT −1
t=0

E{Ci∗ (t)} = limT →∞

1
T

(3.94)

(3.95)

(3.96)
PT −1
t=0

E{Di∗ (t)}.

Thus, the component (3.94) is equal to 0. Since Qi (t) ≤ Qmax
< ∞ for all t ≥ 0 where
i
Qmax
is a constant defned in (3.52), we have lim supT →∞
i

1
T

PT −1
t=0

E{Qi (t)} ≤ Qmax
,
i

i.e., queue Qi (t) is strongly stable [36]. Since yi (t) − Ti (t) ≤ yi (t) ≤ yimax , we know that
queue Qi (t) is also rate stable (Theorem 2.8, i.e., Strong Stability Theorem, in [36]), i.e.,
lim supT →∞

1
T

PT −1
t=0

E{Ti (t)} ≤ lim supT →∞

1
T

PT −1
t=0

E{yi∗ (t)}, which means the com-

ponent (3.95) is no larger than 0. Similarly, since yi (t) − ǫi 1Qi (t)>0 ≤ yimax , queue Zi (t) is
rate stable and lim supT →∞ f rac1T
Thus, we have limT →∞

1
T

PT −1
t=0

PT −1
t=0

E{ǫi 1Qi (t)>0 } ≤ lim supT →∞

1
T

PT −1
t=0

E{yi∗ (t)}.

E{ǫi − yi∗ (t)} ≤ 0, i.e., the component (3.96) is no larger

than 0. Therefore, we have

b (t)}
E{L((t + 1))} − E{L((t))} + V E{U

≤ K + V E{U ∗ (t)}
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(3.97)

Similar to the proof of Theorem 1c in Section 3.3.2.2, summing the above inequality
over all the time slots t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1}, dividing both sides by V T , and taking limits
as T → ∞, we can get P3∗ ≥ P4∗ − K/V .
Besides, as shown in d), the optimal solution to P4 is also a feasible solution to P3.
Thus, the value of the objective function of P3 calculated based on the optimal solution to
P4, i.e., P4∗ , is an upper bound on P3∗ , i.e, P3∗ ≤ P4∗ .
We have now completed the proof.

3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our dynamic energy management scheme
using practical renewable energy generation data. We study two cases: when users have DI
load demands only and when users have both DI and DT load demands. In each case, we
frst obtain the lower and upper bounds on the optimal result. Then, we calculate our total
energy generation cost and compare it with that of a simple energy management strategy.
We implement our proposed dynamic energy management schemes on a general purpose
PC with 64-bit Windows 7, 25GB RAM, and a 2.26GHz CPU. Using CPLEX, we solve
optimization problems P2 and P4 for the two cases, respectively.
Some simulation settings are as follows. We consider 10 users using energy for a period
of 10 days with 5-minute long time slots, i.e., 3000 time slots in total. Users’ renewable
energy generation capabilities are set based on the global horizontal irradiance data for
Las Vegas area available at the Measurement and Instrumentation Data Center [32]. In
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particular, we assume the energy conversion effciency is 15% and the maximum output
is 200W . Besides, the maximum charging and discharging limits on each user’s energy
storage device in a time slot, i.e., Cimax and Dimax , are both set to 1.5kWh. The maximum
,
amount of energy that each user can draw from the power grid in a time slot, i.e., Gmax
i
is set to the maximum load request plus the maximum charging limit in a time slot. The
maximum amount of energy that each user can sell to the grid, i.e., Mimax , is set to be the
. In addition, we ignore the utility company’s renewable energy resource
same as Gmax
i
and focus on the management of users’ energy resources in this simulation. So the utility
company’s energy generation cost function is defned as U (t) = aP 2 (t) + bP (t) + c, where
a = 0.75, b = 0.1 and c = 0.
In the case that users have DI load demands only, we consider that each user’s DI load
demands are i.i.d. uniform random variables over the interval [1,7]kWh. Fig. 3.1(a) shows
the upper and lower bounds on the optimal result. Note that the upper bound is the time
averaged expected total cost during the whole simulation period, obtained by our dynamic
energy management scheme. The lower bound is the upper bound minus A/V as shown in
Theorem 1 in Section 3.3.2.2. In our simulations, we set V = V max . Recall that according
to Theorem 1 in Section 3.3.2.2, A is independent of B max while V max increases as B max
increases. Thus, the performance bounds get tighter as B max increases as we can see in
Fig. 3.1(a). In addition, we compare in Fig. 3.1(b) the total energy generation cost of our
dynamic energy management scheme since t = 0 with that of a simple energy management
strategy. In particular, the simple strategy satisfes users’ DI load demands in the same time
slot when they are requested. It does not consider users selling energy to the grid or using
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energy storage devices. We can observe noticeable savings using our scheme, which keep
increasing as time goes by.
In the case that each user has both a DI and a DT load demands, we consider that each
user’s both load demands are i.i.d. uniform random variables over the interval [1,3.5]kWh.
= 2016, and set
We set all DT load demand deadlines to 168 hours (7 days), i.e., µmax
i
ǫi according to (3.77) for each energy storage device size. We show the upper and lower
bounds on the optimal result in Fig. 3.2(a), and fnd that the bounds get tighter as B max
increases. We also compare the total energy generation cost of our dynamic energy management scheme since t = 0 with that of a simple energy management strategy in Fig.
3.2(b). In particular, the simple strategy satisfes users’ DI and DT load demands in the
same time slot when they are requested. It does not consider users selling energy to the
grid or using energy storage devices. We can observe noticeable savings using our scheme
as well. Fig. 3.2(c) shows the time that it takes DT load demands to be satisfed when each
user has an energy storage device with capability of B max = 240kWh. We observe that
all DT loads can be served within 15 hours, much earlier than the user-defned deadline.
In Fig. 3.2(d), we present the energy level of a user’s energy storage device which always
remains within its physical limits as described in Theorem 2 in Section 3.4.4.2.
Moreover, although in our dynamic energy management schemes, the optimization
problems P2 and P4 need to be solved once every time slot, we fnd that on average they
can be solved in about 0.3 seconds on the PC we use for our simulations. The computation
time is very low and can be even lower on more powerful computers.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored dynamic energy management in the Smart Grid, considering unpredictable load demands, and distributed uncertain renewable energy resources
and energy storage devices. We have studied two kinds of user load demands: DI demands
only, and both DI and DT demands. In particular, with the objective of minimizing the
long-term time averaged expected total cost of supporting all users’ load demands, we
formulate an optimization problem, which is a time-coupling problem and prohibitively
expensive to solve. Then, employing Lyapunov optimization theory, we reformulate the
problem and develop a dynamic energy management scheme which can dynamically solve
the problem in each time slot. The developed scheme result in both a lower and an upper bound on the optimal result of the original optimization problem. Furthermore, in the
case of both DI and DT load demands, we show that DT load demands are guaranteed be
served within user-defned deadlines. Extensive simulation results are presented to validate
the effciency of the proposed scheme.
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The case of DI load demands.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY-PRESERVING ENERGY THEFT DETECTION IN SMART GRIDS

4.1 Introduction
Energy theft has been a notorious problem in traditional power systems. The utility
companies (UCs) in the U.S. lose approximately six billion dollars every year due to this
problem [31]. Recently, the smart grid has been proposed as a new type of electrical grid
to modernize current power grids to effciently deliver reliable, economic, and sustainable
electricity services. One of the most salient features of smart grids is the replacement of
conventional analog mechanical meters by digital meters, usually called “smart meters”.
In addition to recording users’ energy usage, due to their communication capability, smart
meters can provide a two-way communication path between UCs and power users, which
can facilitate effcient power system control and monitoring. However, compared to mechanical meters which can only be physically tampered, smart meters are vulnerable to
more types of attacks (e.g., network attack), which may make energy theft easier to commit and hence an even more serious problem in smart grids.
Some research has been conducted to detect energy theft in traditional power grids.
Nizar et al. [38] employ a data mining technique known as Extreme Learning Machine
(ELM) to classify users’ electricity consumption patterns or load-profles. By comparing
the results to a database of users’ load profles, the proposed algorithm yields a list of users
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who could be stealing energy, which we call “energy thieves”. Nagi et al. [34] propose a
similar approach but choose to use genetic algorithms and Support Vector Machine (SVM)
instead of ELM. Depuru et al. [14] develop another data mining based scheme utilizing
SVM as well. Unfortunately, these techniques cannot sort out the energy thieves with
absolute certainty. In contrast, Bandim et al. [5] propose a central observer to measure the
total energy consumption of a small number of users, and are able to identify all the energy
thieves by comparing the total energy consumption with the reported energy consumption
from the users.
Notice that in all the above works, the UC has to know some of users’ private information, e.g., users’ load profles or meter readings at certain times, in order to fnd the
energy thieves. However, the disclosure of such information would violate users’ privacy
and raise concerns about privacy, safety, etc. In particular, users’ private information may
be sold to interested third-parties. Insurance companies may buy load-profles from the UC
to make premium adjustments on the users’ policies. For example, they could fnd electricity consumption patterns that increase the risk of fre in a property and increase insurance
premiums accordingly. Marketing companies may also be interested in this data to identify
potential customers. Moreover, criminals may utilize such private information to commit
crimes. For instance, robbers may analyze the energy consumption pattern of potential
victims to deduce their daily behavior. They can even know if a robbery alarm has been set
at their target location [43]. Many researchers, such as Quinn [42], have realized how high
resolution electricity usage information can be used to reconstruct many intimate details
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of a consumer’s daily life and invade his/her privacy, and thus call for state legislators and
public utility commissions to address this new privacy threat [35].
Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of research on privacy-preserving energy theft
detection in smart grids. Li et al. [29] design a privacy-preserving aggregation protocol
to collect the total energy consumption of a group of users at a distribution station in
smart grids, which shares a similar idea to those works like [21] on privacy-preserving
data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. However, such algorithms cannot be used
to detect energy theft in smart grids. To the best of our knowledge, we are the frst to
investigate the energy theft detection problem considering users’ privacy issues.
In particular, intuitively and as in previous works, we need to know about a user’s
electric power consumption in order to tell whether he/she is committing fraud or not,
which, however, results in the reveal of the user’s privacy. Therefore, energy theft detection
and users’ privacy seem to be two conficting problems. How to detect energy theft while
preserving users’ privacy is a challenging problem. In this paper, utilizing peer-to-peer
(P2P) computing [46], we propose three distributed algorithms to solve a linear system of
equations (LSE) for the users’ “honesty coeffcients”. If a user’s honesty coeffcient is equal
to 1, this user is honest. Otherwise, if the honesty coeffcient is larger than 1, then this user
has reported less consumed energy and hence is committing fraud. The users’ privacy can
be preserved because they do not need to disclose any of their energy consumption data to
others.
More specifcally, we propose to take advantage of distributed LU and QR decompositions to solve our LSE. Although some distributed algorithms for LU or QR decomposi78

tion [39] have been proposed in the literature, e.g., [1,18,30,57], they cannot preserve each
node’s private information. In this paper, we frst develop a distributed privacy-preserving
energy theft detection algorithm leveraging LU decomposition, called LUD. We fnd that
LUD can successfully identify all the energy thieves in a small size network but may be unstable in large networks1 . Then, we design another algorithm based on LU decomposition
with partial pivoting, called LUDP, which can fnd all the energy thieves even in large-size
networks. We also propose a third algorithm by QR decomposition, called QRD, which
also works well in large-size networks. Moreover, the LUD, LUDP, and QRD algorithms
are proposed in the case that users commit energy theft at a constant rate, i.e., with constant
honesty coeffcients. We further propose adaptive LUD/LUDP/QRD algorithms to account
for the scenarios where the users have variable honesty coeffcients.
In addition, after presenting the proposed algorithms, we analyze the computational
and communication complexities of the two stable algorithms, i.e., LUDP and QRD. We
fnd that LUDP algorithm has a computational complexity of (2n3 /3) and a communication complexity of (2n3 /3), and the QRD algorithm has a computational complexity
of (2n3 ) and a communication complexity of (5n3 /6). In other words, the QRD algorithm has higher computational complexity and higher communication complexity compared with the LUDP algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces network model.
Section 4.3 presents the linear system of equations for energy theft detection. Section
4.4 details the proposed distributed algorithms for solving the LSE. Computational and
1

This is due to the rounding errors in LU decomposition.
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communication complexity analysis is provided in Section 4.5. Simulation results are
shown in Section 4.6. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 4.7.

4.2 Network Model
In this section, we frst present the network architecture considered in this paper, and
then briefy introduce the possible attacks on smart meters (SMs) by energy thieves, and
possible implementations of the proposed algorithms on the SMs.

4.2.1 Network Architecture
In the smart grid, communications and electricity networks overlay each other. Utility
companies (UCs) deploy control centers (CCs) to monitor their distribution stations (DSs)
and distribution networks, and deploy SMs at users’s premises to measure their individual
energy consumption. Since a CC is usually physically far away from users, a communication entity that can facilitate the communication between users and the CC is necessary.
To this end, an access point, called “the collector”, is placed at each of the serviced areas.
One SM is installed at each collector to measure the total energy consumed by the serviced
area.
A typical network architecture is depicted in Figure 4.1. In a serviced area, the users’
SMs together with the collector form a Field Area Network (FAN). The communications
among SMs and between SMs and the collector are carried out wirelessly due to SMs’
communication capability, while the communications among the CC, the DS, and the collector are conducted via wired medium.
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Figure 4.1
A typical architecture of Field Area Network (FAN).
4.2.2

Attacks on Smart Meters

Smart meters can provide the users with a plethora of unique features. For example,
users can be provided with real time electricity pricing and thus determine when to turn
on/off some of their electrical devices. Smart meters can also send incentive-based load
reduction signals to users so that they can be compensated for their efforts to save energy.
However, compared to mechanical meters which can only be physically tampered, smart
meters are vulnerable to more types of attacks, which may make energy theft easier to
commit and hence an even more serious problem in smart grids.

4.2.2.1

Physical Attack

Conventional mechanical meters and SMs are both vulnerable to this type of attack. It
refers to the scenarios where illegal users physically modify their meters to record wrong
values that will lower their electric bills. Physical attack to electricity meters includes
meter reversing, tampering with strong magnets, pressure coil damaging, supply voltage
regulation, and even disconnecting the meters. The readers are referred to [13] for a more
extensive description on physical attacks.
81

One way to detect physical attacks is to visually check the meter for any broken seals or
other signs of damage. However, this detection method is both resource and time consuming because employees from the UC have to visit the users’ premises to verify the meters’
integrity. Moreover, signs of damage may not be obvious and seals may be replaced.

4.2.2.2 Network Attack
An illegal user can operate a malicious node to perform network attack. For example,
an illegal user may impersonate his/her own SM and make it record lower power consumption. Network attack may be easier to launch and more diffcult to detect.
In addition to attacking the smart meter, a user may also get some energy that is not
being measured, e.g., through a conductor that bypasses the meter. In this case, the smart
meter does not correctly measure the energy consumption of the user and hence can also
be considered as being attacked. The proposed algorithms can address all these problems.

4.2.3 Possible Implementation of the Proposed Algorithms
The proposed algorithms can be implemented in the frmware of the smart meters.
Many mechanisms have been proposed to protect the frmware of embedded systems, such
as passwords, centralized intrusion detection, local intrusion detection, and intrusion selfreporting. For example, LeMay et al. [27] develop a remote attestation mechanism that
allows centralized intrusion detection of all SMs in a neighborhood. If any intrusion to the
frmware is detected by the UC, the suspect SMs cannot be trusted and must be inspected.
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Consequently, SMs can be trusted in correctly executing the proposed privacy preserving
energy theft detection algorithms2 .

4.3 A Linear System of Equations for Energy Theft Detection
In this section, we present a mathematical model for energy theft detection. As mentioned before, we assume that an SM is installed at the collector such that the collector can
know the total power consumption of the users in the service area. We also assume that
the UC installs an SM at each of the users’ premises, which is capable of recording energy
consumption at any time instant.
Consider a FAN of n users. We defne a sampling period denoted by SP . Then, after
every sampling period, all the n + 1 SMs will record their energy consumption in the past
sampling period. We denote such energy consumption recorded by user j (1 ≤ j ≤ n)
and by the collector at time ti , by pti ,j and P ti , respectively. We further defne an honesty
coeffcient, denoted by kj where kj > 0, for each user j. Thus, kj ·pti ,j gives the real energy
consumption of user j from time instant ti − SP to time instant ti . Since the sum of all the
recorded energy consumption at time ti must be equal to the total energy consumption of
the neighborhood measured at the collector at time ti , we have
k1 pti ,1 + k2 pti ,2 + ... + kn pti ,n = P ti

(4.1)

Our objective is to fnd all the kj ’s. Obviously, 1) if kj = 1, then user j is honest
and did not steal energy; 2) if kj > 1, then user j recorded less energy than what he/she
2

Note that although we assume a secure frmware for SMs, the upper layer software for SMs can still be
compromised.
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consumes and hence is an energy thief; and 3) if 0 < kj < 1, then user j recorded more
than what he/she consumes, which means that his/her smart meter may be malfunctioning.
In particular, with n linear equations, we can have a linear system of equations (LSE)
as follows:
k1 pt1 ,1 + k2 pt1 ,2 + ... + kn pt1 ,n = P t1
..
.

(4.2)

k1 ptn ,1 + k2 ptn ,2 + ... + kn ptn ,n = P tn
which can also be formulated in matrix form:
P k = P.

(4.3)

The jth column of P represents the data recorded and stored by user j or SMj , while the
ith row of P represents the data recorded by all the users at ti . The collector can choose
n time instances when P ti ’s all have different values. In this case, it is highly likely that
the LSE is independent and the rows of P are independent as well, especially when n is
large3 . Thus, the above LSE only has a single unique solution, i.e., the feasible solution
kj = pti ,j /pti ,j where pti ,j is the real energy consumption of user j from time instant
ti − SP to time instant ti .
Note that our model does not take into account power dissipation, or technical losses
(TLs), in the power system, which are mainly caused by the intrinsic ineffciencies in transformers and low voltage power lines. However, TLs can be calculated without using con3
Besides, note that usually there are always some appliances running at users’ premises, such as refrigerators and air conditioners, whose working powers are in practice dynamic with some fuctuations instead of
constants.
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sumers’ power measurements. For example, Oliveira et al. [40] describe how to calculate
TLs using measurements at the distribution station and the knowledge of the distribution
network which does not need to compromise users’ privacy. Thus, once the technical losses
are calculated by the collector, the collector can adjust the model by subtracting the TLs
from vector P.
Besides, note that fnding the honesty coeffcient vector, k, is delay tolerant. In other
words, k, is not required to be found and transmitted to the collector in real time. This
gives priority to other real time traffc in the FAN, such as electricity pricing, incentivebased load reduction signals, and emergency load reduction signals.

4.4

Finding Honesty Coeffcients by P2P Computing
In what follows, based on P2P computing (or distributed/collaborative computing),

we propose three algorithms that can solve the linear system of equations in (4.3) while
preserving the users’ privacy. The challenge is that each smart meter SMj needs to fnd
its own honesty coeffcient kj without knowing any of the other smart meters’ recorded
energy consumption data pti ,l ’s, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j 6= l.
Specifcally, we frst develop an LU decomposition based approach, called LUD, to
detect the energy thieves while preserving users’ privacy. We notice that in its original
form, LUD may not be numerically stable in large size networks. The reason is that the
inaccuracies involved when using fnite resolution numbers may lead to solutions with signifcant errors when n is large. Therefore, after proposing the LUD algorithm, we design
another algorithm to achieve numerical stability by exchanging rows of the matrix P dur85

ing LU decomposition, i.e., LUD with partial pivoting (LUDP). After that, we also propose
a QR Decomposition based algorithm, called QRD, to perform stable P2P computing in
large-scale networks to fnd the energy thieves.
In the following, we detail these three algorithms, respectively, when the honesty coeffcient vector, k, is a constant, and then discuss the cases where k changes with time.

4.4.1 The LUD Algorithm
We frst describe the LUD algorithm as follows, which is based on distributed LU
decomposition. The LU decomposition is to factorize the power consumption data matrix
P into two triangular matrices: a lower triangular matrix L and an upper triangular matrix
U , i.e., P = LU .
The elements of upper triangular matrix U can be calculated as follows:
ui,j = 0,

i>j

(4.4)

j = 1, 2, ..., n

(4.5)

r = 2, ..., n, j = r, ..., n

(4.6)

u1,j = pt1,j ,
ur,j = ptr,j −

r−1
X

lr,k uk,j ,

k=1

where pti,j is the ith element of column j in matrix P . Besides, the elements of lower
triangular matrix L can be obtained by
li,j = 0,

i<j

(4.7)

i = 1, 2, ..., n

(4.8)

q = 2, ..., n, i = q, .., n

(4.9)

li,1 =
pti,q −
li,q =

q−1
P

k=1

uq,q

pti,1
,
pt1 ,1

li,k uk,q
,
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Note that the diagonal elements of L are equal to 1. This guarantees that the decomposition
of P is unique.
After matrices L and U are collaboratively computed, the following system can be
solved:
Ly = P,

(4.10)

U k = y.

(4.11)

In particular, to solve for y, each SMj−1 will calculate yj as follows, i.e., y1 = P t1 , and
yj = P t j −

j−1
X

lj,q yq ,

j = 2, ..., n.

(4.12)

q=1

The required values for this computation are the elements of y with index less than j and
row j of L. Finally, Each SMj solves for kj using backward substitution, i.e., kn =

yn
,
un,n

and
yj −
kj =

n
P

uj,p kp

p=j+1

j = 1, ..., n − 1.

uj,j

(4.13)

Therefore, our LUD algorithm is composed of two parts: Distributed LU Decomposition and Backward Substitution, which are detailed by Procedure 1 in Fig. 4.2 and Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3, respectively. Besides, before the algorithm can begin, the collector must
number all the SMs from 1 to n, and the index number of any SM is only known to the SM
itself and the collector. The collector also transmits P tj+1 to each SMj to allow the SMs to
collaboratively compute L, U , and y. We denote the smart meter at the collector as SM0 .
All SMs start running Procedure 1 in Fig. 4.2 when the collector requests them by sending
a control message.
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Specifcally, SM0 frst calculates y1 = P t1 , and then transmits it to SM1 . SM0 does
not need to compute any element of L or U . After SM1 receives y1 , it computes column
1 of U , column 1 of L, and y2 . Then, SM1 transmits column 1 of L, y1 , and y2 to SM2 .
SMj (1 < j < n), receives y1 through yj and columns 1 through j − 1 of L from SMj−1 ,
based on which it calculates column j of U , column j of L, and yj+1 . After that, SMj
transmits columns 1 through j of L and y1 through yj+1 to SMj+1 . Finally, SMn receives
yn and columns 1 through n − 1 from SMn−1 , calculates column n of U and column n of
L, and notifes the collector that the Back Substitution procedure, i.e., Procedure 2 in Fig.
4.3, can start. Notice that each SMj (j > 0) is responsible for computing column j of U ,
column j of L, and yj+1 (1 ≤ j < n).
After Procedure 1 in Fig. 4.2 ends, SMj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) has obtained the jth column
of U and yj . The collector then instructs all the smart meters to run Procedure 2 in Fig.
4.3 to solve for their own honesty coeffcients according to (4.12), starting from SMn . In
particular, SMn transmits un−1,n kn , which is needed by SMn−1 to solve for kn−1 , along
with un−2,n kn , ..., u1,n kn , needed by SMn−2 , ..., SM1 , respectively, to SMn−1 . Similarly, SMj (1 < j < n) receives
transmits

Pn

q=j

Pn

q=j+1

uj,q kq from SMj+1 and solves for kj , and then

uj−1,q kq along with u1,j kj , ..., uj−2,j kj , u1,j+1 kj+1 , ..., uj−2,j+1 kj+1 , ...,

u1,n kn ...uj−2,n kn to SMj−1 . Finally, SM1 receives

Pn

q=2

u1,q kq from SM2 and solves for

k1 . Moreover, after obtaining its honesty coeffcient, each smart meter SMj encrypts kj
using the collector’s public key, resulting in E(kj ), and then transmits E(kj ) to the collector. When all the E(kj )’s have been reported to the collector, the LSE can be successfully
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solved, and hence the collector can decrypt all the elements of k and identify all the fraudulent users.
Notice that in LUD, the collector does not know L or U , and hence cannot recover P .
Moreover, from equation (4.13), we can observe that SMj will need all the elements of
U in row j and kn , kn−1 , ..., kj+1 in order to compute kj . If such data are transmitted to
SMj separately, an eavesdropper would be able to fgure out all the elements of U , except
those on the diagonal, by eavesdropping on all the transmissions in the network. Since an
eavesdropper is able to obtain L by eavesdropping, too, it can fgure out some elements
of P (e.g., all the elements above the diagonal of P ). To prevent this from happening,
as mentioned above and shown by Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3, we transmit the multiplication
of an element of U and the corresponding honesty coeffcient instead. Notice that in this
case an eavesdropper may be able to guess the power consumption of certain honest users
(i.e., those whose honesty coeffcients are equal to 1) at certain times by assuming k = 1.
However, even so since the eavesdropper does not know the mapping between smart meter
indexes and users (only the collector knows), it cannot really know any user’s power consumption data. Besides, the eavesdropper does not know which users are honest anyway.
In addition, to defend against the case that the collector has the capability of eavesdropping
on all the transmissions in the network, we can just enable each neighboring two smart meters, i.e., SMj and SMj+1 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, to establish a symmetric security key on
their own to encrypt the data transmitted in Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3 (line 7 and line 8). In
so doing, no user’s private data will be revealed to or recovered by anyone else.
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4.4.2 The LUDP Algorithm
As mentioned before, LUD may not be numerically stable when n is large. Here, we
propose another algorithm, i.e., LUD with partial pivoting (LUDP), to address the stability
problem. Partial pivoting is to interchange rows of the matrix P in order to place the
element that has the greatest absolute value in each column in the diagonal position of the
matrix. Thus, LUDP decomposition has the following form, EP = LU , where E is the
permutation matrix.

The LUDP algorithm consists of three procedures: LU Decomposition with Partial
Pivoting, Forward Substitution, and Backward Substitution. Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4 shows
how LU decomposition with partial pivoting works. Specifcally, we frst let U = P .
Then, SM1 fnds the maximum element in column 1 of U , lets the pivot index of column
1 be the row this element is in, interchanges this element with the element in row 1 if it
is not, and updates the frst column of U . SM1 also computes the frst column of L, and
transmits it together with the pivot index of column 1 to SM2 . Note that in LUDP, we
compute U and L in a different way from that in LUD, as shown in Line 8 and Line 17
of Procedure 3, respectively, which now allows partial pivoting [39]. After receiving the
data from SM1 , SM2 repeats SM1 ’s row interchange, i.e., interchanging the element in
column 2, SM1 ’s pivot index row of U with the element in column 2, row 1 of U . Then,
SM2 performs its own row interchange, which is to interchange the maximum element in
column 2 of U with the second element in column 2 of U , lets the pivot index of column 2
be the row this maximum element was in, and updates the second column of U . After that,
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SM2 computes the second column of L, and transmits the frst two columns of L along
with the pivot index of SM1 and of SM2 to SM3 . Finally, SMn receives columns 1 to
n − 1 of L and all the previous nodes’ pivot indexes from SMn−1 , repeats all the previous
row interchanges, performs its own row interchange, and calculates column n of U . Note
that lj,j = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Moreover, due to (4.3), we need make the same row interchanges for P as those for
P . Thus, we let SMn send all the n pivot row indexes to the collector SM0 , which then
performs the same row interchanges for P. Now we can solve for y and k according to
(4.10) and (4.11), respectively. In particular, since y is computed according to (4.12), y
can only be computed after Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4 is fnished, which is different from that
in LUD where y can be computed at the same time as L and U . Therefore, we propose the
Forward Substitution procedure as shown in Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, to enable the smart
meters to solve for y in a distributed way. Forward Substitution calculates yj according to
(4.12), and works similar to Backward Substitution except that it starts from SM1 . At last,
after y is available, Back Substitution as described by Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3 can be used
to solve for k.

Furthermore, the same as that in LUD, we can enable each neighboring two smart
meters, i.e., SMj and SMj+1 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, to establish a symmetric security key
on their own and encrypt the data transmitted in Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3 (line 7 and line 8)
to protect users’ privacy.
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Compared to the LUD algorithm, LUDP takes more time to complete. This is because
in LUDP the forward substitution to calculate y can only be carried out after L and U have
been obtained, while in LUD, y, L, and U can be obtained at the same time. On the other
hand, LUDP is numerically stable while LUD is not.

4.4.3 The QRD Algorithm
Here, we present another privacy-preserving energy theft detection algorithm, called
QRD. In particular, by QR decomposition, matrix P can be decomposed into an orthogonal
matrix Q and an upper triangular matrix R, i.e., P = QR, where Q−1 = QT . Thus, we
have P k = QRk = P, which yields a new system
Rk = QT P.

(4.14)

The basic idea is to utilize distributed QR decomposition to enable each smart meter to
compute its own honesty coeffcient without using other smart meters’ energy consumption
data.
We frst present how to determine Q and R in the following. In particular, QT is
formed as the product of

n(n−1)
2

plane rotation matrices as follows:

QT = Gn,n−1 (Gn−1,n−2 Gn,n−2 ) · · · (G2,1 · · · Gn,1 ).

(4.15)

Let P̂1,0 = P and
P̂i,j = (Gi,j · · · Gn,j ) · · · (G2,1 · · · Gn,1 )P̂1,0 .

(4.16)

Then, P̂i,j = Gi,j P̂i+1,j when i < n and P̂i,j = Gi,j P̂j,j−1 when i = n. Besides, when
Gi,j multiplies P̂i+1,j when i < n (or P̂j,j−1 when i = n) from the left, it zeros element
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P̂i+1,j (i, j) when i < n (or P̂j,j−1 (i, j) when i = n), modifes rows i and i − 1 of P̂i+1,j
(or P̂j,j−1 ), and preserves previously introduced zeros4 . Finally, QT P reduces P into an
upper triangular matrix R, i.e., P̂n,n−1 = R.
The two most common methods to fnd plane rotation matrices (Gi,j ’s) are Householder Rotations and Givens Rotations (GR). In this paper we adopt the GR approach. The
non-zero elements of Gi+1,j are
gqq = 1, q 6= i, j

(4.17)

gi,i = ci,j , gi+1,i+1 = ci,j , gi,i+1 = si,j , gi+1,i = −si,j

(4.18)

where ci,j and si,j are calculated as
′

2
pi,j = (p2i,j + pi+1,j
)1/2 , ci,j =

pi+1,j
pi,j
.
′ , si,j =
′
pi,j
pi,j

(4.19)

Note that for simplicity we use pi,j to denote the element in ith row and jth column in the
previously rotated matrix, i.e., P̂i+2,j when i < n − 1 and P̂j,j−1 when i = n − 1.
Besides, the elements of the matrix after rotation, i.e., P̂i+1,j , are
for r ≥ j

(4.20)

P̂i+1,j (i + 1, j) = 0

(4.21)

P̂i+1,j (i, r) = ci,j pi,r + si,j pi+1,r

P̂i+1,j (i + 1, r) = −si,j pi,r + ci,j pi+1,r

for r > j

(4.22)

We denote by Gi,j the set that contains ci,j and si,j , i.e., Gi,j = {ci,j , si,j }. From equation (4.19), we can observe that the values needed by SMj to compute Gi,j reside in column
j. This allows SMj to fnd all its rotation matrices, i.e., Gj+1,j ,..., Gn,j , only using its
4

P̂i+1,j (i, j) denotes the element of matrix P̂i+1,j in row i, column j.
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locally stored and calculated data. Moreover, (4.20) shows that SMr , when r > j, needs
the set Gi,j from SMj to update its own data, i.e., column r of the rotated matrix P̂i+1,j .
In addition, notice that each column j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) has n − j elements that need to be converted to zero in order to fnally fnd R in (4.14). The set that contains all the Gi,j ’s which
need to be calculated by SMj , denoted by Bj , is thus Bj = {Gn−1,j , Gn−2,j , ..., Gj,j }.
The QRD algorithm is composed of two procedures: Distributed QR Decomposition
and Backward Substitution. Distributed QR Decomposition works as follows. SM1 frst
generates Gn,1 · · · G2,1 to zero n − 1 elements in the frst column of P and hence obtain
the frst column of R. After that, it transmits B1 to SM2 . SM2 uses B1 to update its energy
consumption data, i.e,. the second column of P , and generates Gn,2 · · · G3,2 to fnd the
second column of R. After that, SM2 transmits B1 and B2 to SM3 , and so on and so
forth. Finally, SMn receives B1 , B2 , ..., and Bn−1 from SMn−1 , updates its own energy
consumption data, fnds the nth column of R. SMn then transmits B1 , B2 , ..., and Bn to the
collector. Therefore, at the end of this procedure each smart meter SMj can obtain the jth
column of R, and the collector can compute QT and hence QT P using (4.15) and (4.17).
The procedure is explained in details in Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6.

After Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6, the collector will instruct the smart meters to run Backward Substitution to compute their honesty coeffcients in a distributed way. In particular,
according to (4.14), at SMj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) we have
rj,j kj + rj,j+1 kj+1 + ... + rj,n kn = QT P(j)
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(4.23)

where ri,j is the element in the ith row and the jth column of R, and QT P(j) is the
jth element of QT P. So, once the collector receives all the sets Bj ’s from SMn , it will
compute QT P and distribute the jth element to SMj . SMn can then obtain its honesty coeffcient kn . After that, SMn transmits rn−1,n kn , which is needed by SMn−1 to
solve for kn−1 , along with rn−2,n kn , ..., r1,n kn , needed by SMn−2 , ..., SM1 , respectively,
to SMn−1 . Similarly, SMj receives
then transmits

Pn

q=j

Pn

q=j+1 rj,q kq

from SMj+1 and solves for kj , and

rj−1,q kq along with r1,j kj , ..., rj−2,j kj , r1,j+1 kj+1 , ..., rj−2,j+1 kj+1 ,

..., r1,n kn ...rj−2,n kn to SMj−1 . Finally, SM1 receives

Pn

q=2 r1,q kq

from SM2 and solves

for k1 . Moreover, after obtaining its honesty coeffcient, each smart meter SMj encrypts
kj using the collector’s public key, resulting in E(kj ), and then transmits E(kj ) to the
collector. When all the E(kj )’s have been reported to the the collector, the LSE can be
successfully solved, and hence the collector can decrypt all the elements of k and identify
all the fraudulent users. This procedure is detailed in Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7.
Notice that in QRD, although the collector can recover Q by knowing the rotation
matrices Gi,j ’s, it does not know R and hence cannot recover P . Moreover, similar to
that in LUD and LUDP, we can enable each neighboring two smart meters, i.e., SMj and
SMj+1 where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, to establish a symmetric security key on their own and
encrypt the data transmitted in Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7 (line 7 and line 8) to protect users’
privacy, if the collector can eavesdrop on all the transmissions in the network.
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4.4.4 Variable Honesty Coeffcients
In the above LUD, LUDP, and QRD algorithms, we have only considered that the
honesty coeffcient vector k is a constant5 . However, when an illegal user commits energy
theft, it is possible that the rate at which he/she steals energy is variable. In other words,
an illegal user can alter the smart meter in such a way that it steals energy at different rates
at different times. Unfortunately, if k changes in an LSE, the proposed algorithms may not
work well. Next, we design adaptive algorithms to address this problem.
We notice that when k changes in an LSE, the LUD, LUDP, and QRD algorithms will
result in an honesty coeffcient vector, many of whose elements are not equal to 1. Thus,
when the collector gets the honesty coeffcient vector k and counts the number of elements
that are not equal to 1, it can infer by statistics whether it is possible to have this many
energy thieves in the network. If it is unlikely for this event to happen, the collector can
reduce the sampling period SP and run the algorithms again, until the possibility of that
event is high and k does not change any more.
We give a mathematical model as follows. Assume there are n users in a serviced area
and each of them commits energy theft independently with the same probability p. Let X
denote the total number of energy thieves in the neighborhood. Then, X is a random variable, which has a Binomial distribution. Thus, when the collector runs LUD/LUDP/QRD
and obtains the honesty coeffcient vector k, it can fnd the number of elements that are not
5

Note that we can enable the SMs to report to the collector if they are disconnected from the loads.
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equal to 1, which we denote by Y . Then, the collector can calculate the probability that
this event happens as follows:
 
n Y
P (X = Y ) =
p (1 − p)n−Y .
Y

(4.24)

In addition, in the case that each user j commits energy theft independently with a
different probability pj , X is also a random variable, but its expectation becomes E[X] =
Pn

j=1

pj . Recall the Chernoff bounds [9]:

• For any δ > 0,
P (X > (1 + δ)E[X]) < e−E[X]f (δ)

(4.25)

where f (δ) = (1 + δ) log(1 + δ) − δ.
• For any 0 < δ < 1,
1 2
E[X]

P (X < (1 − δ)E[X]) < e− 2 δ

.

(4.26)

Then, the collector can infer whether the obtained k is true or not by calculating
P (X ≥ Y ) < e−E[X]f (δ) with δ = Y /E[X] − 1

(4.27)

when Y > E[X], and
1 2
E[X]

P (X ≤ Y ) < e− 2 δ

with δ = 1 − Y /E[X]

(4.28)

when Y < E[X]. Besides, when Y = E[X], we set P (X = Y ) = 16 .
Thus, if the estimated probability P is lower than a threshold th, we reduce the sampling period SP by g (g > 0), which is a step variable, and run the LUD/LUDP/QRD
6

As shown in Procedure 7 in Fig. 4.8, by setting P (X = Y ) = 1 in this case, we will run the
LUD/LUDP/QRD algorithm again with a reduced sampling period. If the obtained k does not change any
more, we consider it is the true honesty coeffcient vector we are looking for.
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algorithm again to obtain another k. This process repeats until P is no less than the threshold and the obtained k is the same as the previous one. By then we consider the k is true,
i.e., the real honesty coeffcient vector in the network.
We fnally present the adaptive LUD/LUDP/QRD algorithm in Procedure 7 in Fig. 4.8,
which can detect illegal users with variable honesty coeffcients.

4.5 Computational and Communication Complexity Analysis
In this section we analyze the computational and communication complexities of LUDP
and QRD, the two stable algorithms. We defne the computational complexity as the number of elementary arithmetic operations (additions, subtractions, multiplications, divisions,
and square roots), plus the number of comparisons and row exchanges needed to fnd vector k. We defne the communication complexity as the total traffc demand in the network,
i.e., the total number of quantities that need to be transmitted in the network.

4.5.1 The LUDP Algorithm
4.5.1.1 Computational Complexity
To determine LUDP’s computational cost, we need look into the operations in Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4, Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, and Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3 as follows.
In Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4, lines 6, 8, 14, 15 and 17 conduct computations. Specifcally,
line 6 performs one row exchange and repeats (j − 1) times at SMj , where 2 ≤ j ≤ n
and n is the number of users in the network. Line 15 also performs one row exchange
and repeats (n − 1) times. Thus, the total number of row exchanges in Procedure 3 is
Pn

j=2 (j

− 1) + (n − 1) =

n2 +n−2
.
2
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Line 8 performs two elementary operations and lies inside a nested “for” loop. To
fnd the total number of times that line 8 is executed, we frst consider the nested “for”
loops only, then consider the number of times the procedure is executed. In particular,
the inner “for” loop iterates (n − f ) times and the outer “for” loop iterates (j − 1) times.
Therefore, we have that line 8 executes

Pj−1

f =1 (n

− f ) = n(j − 1) −

j(j−1)
2

times for each

2 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, the total number of elementary operations contributed by this line is
2

Pn

j=2

�

n(j − 1) −

j(j−1)
2



=

2n3 −3n2 +n
.
3

Line 14 contributes one search for the highest absolute value among (n−j+1) elements

in column j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. In the worst case scenario, each search needs (n − j)
comparisons to determine the pivot row. Thus, the total number of elementary operations
by line 14 is

Pn−1

j=1 (n

− j) =

n2 −n
.
2

In addition, line 17 performs one elementary operation and repeats (n − j) times for
1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Therefore, the total number of elementary operations performed by line
17 is

Pn−1

j=1 (n

− j) =

n2 −n
.
2

In Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, line 6 computes (j−1) multiplications and as many additions
or subtractions, which are the computations in lines 8 and 9 carried out at the previous node.
Line 11 also conducts j(n − j − 1) multiplications for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Therefore, the total
number of elementary arithmetic operations in the Forward Substitution procedure is given
by 2

Pn

j=1 (j

− 1) = n2 − n.

99

The computational complexity of Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3, i.e., Backward Substitution,
is similar to that of Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, i.e., Forward Substitution, with the exception
of n additional divisions. So Procedure 2’s computational complexity is
2

n
X

(j − 1) + n = n2 .

(4.29)

j=1

As a result, adding the above computational complexity results together, we can fnd
that the total computational complexity of LUDP, denoted by P CLU DP , is
P CLU DP =

4n3 + 15n2 − 7n − 6
.
6

(4.30)

4.5.1.2 Communication Complexity
The total communication complexity of LUDP is also determined by the traffc demand
of Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4, Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, and Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3.
In Procedure 3 in Fig. 4.4, only lines 20 and 23 account for communications. According to line 20, SMj transmits to SMj+1 the frst j columns of L (n − f + 1 elements in column f ) and j pivot row indexes. Besides, in line 23, SMn transmits all the
n pivot row indices to SM0 , i.e., n quantities. Thus, the traffc demand of Procedure 3 is
Pn−1 � Pj
j=1

f =1 (n


− f + 1) + j + n =

4n3 +6n2 −2n
.
12

In Procedure 4 in Fig. 4.5, lines 3, 7, 10, 11, and 14 carry out transmissions. Lines 3

and 14 are executed only once and transmit one quantity each, while lines 7 and 10 repeat
(n−1) times, each of which transmits one quantity. Line 11 transmits j(n−j−1) quantities
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Consequently, the traffc demand of Procedure 4 is
1) + 2(n − 1) + 2 =

n3 −3n2 +14n
.
6
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Pn−1
j=1

j(n − j −

Similarly, in Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.3, lines 3, 7, and 8 carry out transmissions. Particularly, lines 3 and 7 transmit one quantity each and repeat n and n − 1 times, respectively.
Line 8 transmits (j − 2)(n − j + 1) quantities for 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Therefore, the traffc demand
of Procedure 2 is
n
X

(j − 2)(n − j + 1) + 2n − 1 =

j=2

n3 − 3n2 + 14n − 6
.
6

(4.31)

Thus, from the above results, we can fnd that the total communication complexity of
LUDP, denoted by M CLU DP , is
M CLU DP =

8n3 − 6n2 + 54n − 12
.
12

(4.32)

4.5.2 The QRD Algorithm
4.5.2.1 Computational Complexity
We need examine Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6 and Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7 to analyze QRD’s
computational complexity.
In Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6, line 4 performs six elementary operations (n − f ) times for
1 ≤ f ≤ j − 1, where 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Thus, the total number of elementary operations by line
4 is 6

Pn

j=2

Pj

f =1 (n

− f ) = 2n3 − 8n + 6.

Besides, line 14 carries out six elementary operations and repeats (n − j) times for
1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Therefore, the total number of elementary operations by line 14 is
6

Pn−1

j=1 (n

− j) = 3n2 − 3n.
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Moreover, the computational complexity of Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7 is the same as that
of Procedure 2 in Fig. 4.7 shown in (4.29). As a result, from the above results and (4.29),
we can have that the computational complexity of QRD, denoted by P CQRD , is
P CQRD = 2n3 + 4n2 − 11n + 6.

(4.33)

4.5.2.2 QRD Communication Complexity
The total communication complexity of QRD is also determined by the traffc demand
of Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6 and Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7.
In Procedure 5 in Fig. 4.6 , lines 19 and 21 carry out transmissions of B1 ...Bj for
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since Bk (1 ≤ k ≤ j) contains n − k Gp,q sets, each of which contains two
quantities, the traffc demand of Procedure 5 is 2

Pn

j=1

Pj

k=1 (n

− k) =

2n3 −2n
.
3

Moreover, the traffc demand of Procedure 6 in Fig. 4.7 is the same as that of Procedure
2 in Fig. 4.7 shown in (4.31). Consequently, the communication complexity of QRD,
denoted by M CQRD , is
M CQRD

5n3 − 3n2 + 10n − 6
=
.
6

(4.34)

4.6 Simulation Results
Here, we perform two series of simulations to evaluate the performance of our privacypreserving energy theft detection algorithms LUD, LUDP, and QRD. In the frst part, we
assume that illegal users steal energy at a constant rate and thus have constant honesty
coeffcients. In the second part, we consider that illegal users have variable honesty coeff-
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cients. We conduct simulations in Matlab R2010a. The simulation results in the above two
cases are presented in Section 4.6.1 and Section 4.6.2, respectively.
Besides, we generate users’ power consumption data, P , based on a set of data from [7]
and [51]. These two studies conduct experiments in which both commercial and residential
users are metered every hour and every half-hour, respectively. With these measurements,
both studies provide typical daily user load profles for different days of the week and
different seasons of the year.

4.6.1 Constant Honesty Coeffcients
We frst perform simulations when illegal users steal energy at a constant rate. In other
words, each illegal SM chooses a rate to steal energy and never changes this rate or stops
stealing, thus having a constant honesty coeffcient.
We evaluate the performance of LUD, LUDP, and QRD, when every user commits
energy theft with a probability of 0.3 and there are totally 15, 30, and 50 users, respectively.
Each energy thief chooses a honesty coeffcient uniformly and randomly in [1.1, 10]. As
shown in Fig. 4.9, the LUD algorithm can work well when there are 15 and 30 users in
total. In particular, in Fig. 4.9(a) we can see that 6 users have an honesty coeffcient larger
than 1. It means that these 6 SMs only record a fraction of their consumed energy. Using
these results, the collector can easily identify the energy thieves and how much less they
have paid in their monthly bills. We can also observe that the legal users have an honesty
coeffcient equal to 1 and can be easily identifed as well. Similar results are shown in Fig.
4.9(b) when there are 30 users. Besides, we can also fnd that LUDP and QRD can obtain
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the same results as LUD in these two cases. Moreover, the results of LUD, LUDP, and
QRD when the number of users is 50 are presented in Fig. 4.10. In this case, the LUD
algorithm is not stable. It fnds 49 illegal users while in practice there are only 17 energy
thefts. In contrast, the LUDP and QRD algorithms can successfully identify all the 17
illegal users.

4.6.2 Variable Honesty Coeffcients
We then conduct simulations when illegal users steal energy at variable rates. We
consider that each energy thief chooses a new honesty coeffcient uniformly and randomly
in [1.1, 10] each time after a certain period. we frst consider that all the users commit
energy theft with the same probability p = 0.3, and then consider that each user commits
energy theft with a probability independently and randomly chosen between 0.3 and 0.7.
In particular, when all the users have the same cheating probability p = 0.3, we fnd that
the adaptive LUD algorithm is not stable when there are more than 25 users in the network.
The results are omitted due to space limitation. Besides, we show the results of the adaptive
LUDP/QRD algorithm in Fig. 4.11, when the number of users is equal to 100, 200, and
300, respectively. We can see that all the energy thieves can be found. Moreover, when
each user commits energy theft with a probability independently and randomly chosen
between 0.3 and 0.7, we show the results of the adaptive LUDP/QRD algorithm in Fig.
4.12, in the cases that the number of users is equal to 100, 200, and 300, respectively. We
can fnd that in these cases, the adaptive LUDP/QRD algorithm can also successfully and
effciently identify those fraudulent users.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented three P2P computing algorithms, i.e., LUD, LUDP,
and QRD, which can identify the users who are committing energy theft in smart grids
while preserve all users’ privacy. The three algorithms are distributed algorithms and are
based on LU or QR decomposition. We can observe that no private data from any user
needs to be transmitted to other users or to the collector, which cannot be recovered either,
thus preserving users’ privacy. We have also analyzed the computational and communication complexities of the proposed algorithms, and fnd that QRD has higher computational
complexity and higher communication complexity compared to LUDP. Moreover, extensive simulations have been conducted. The simulation results show that fraudulent users
can be detected both when they commit energy theft at a constant rate, i.e., with constant
honesty coeffcients, and when they steal energy at variable rates, i.e., with variable honesty
coeffcients.
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Input: j → SMj , P tj+1 → SMj
1: if j = 0 or SMj receives packets from SMj−1 then
2:
if j = 0 then
3:
Compute y1 using (4.12)
4:
Transmit y1 only to SM1
5:
end if
6:
if 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 then
7:
for q = 1 to j do
8:
Compute uq,j using (4.4)
9:
end for
10:
for q = j + 1 to n do
11:
Compute lq,j using equation (4.7)
12:
end for
13:
Compute yj+1 using (4.12)
14:
Transmit columns 1, 2, ..., j of L and all known elements of y1 , ..., yj+1
only to SMj+1
15:
end if
16:
if j = n then
17:
Notify the collector that L, U , and y are available
18:
end if
19: end if
Figure 4.2
Procedure 1: Distributed LU Decomposition
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1: if j
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:

= n or SMj receives packet from SMj+1 then
Compute kj as described in (4.13) using sj+1 if necessary
Compute E(kj ) and transmit E(kj ) to the collector
Compute uq,j kj for q = j − 1, j − 2, ..., 1
if j =
6 1 then
Pn
Compute sj = q=j
uj−1,q kq
Transmit sj to SMj−1
Transmit u1,j kj , ..., uj−2,j kj , u1,j+1 kj+1 , ..., uj−2,j+1 kj+1 , ..., u1,n kn , ...,
uj−2,n kn to SMj−1
9:
end if
10: end if
Figure 4.3
Procedure 2: Backward Substitution
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Input: j → SMj
1: U = P
2: if received packet from SMj−1 or j = 1 then
3:
if j =
6 1 then
4:
Receive columns 1, 2, ..., j − 1 of L and pivot indexes
5:
for f = 1 to j − 1 do
6:
Update column j of U by interchanging the jth element of row f
with the jthe element of the pivot row of SMf
7:
for r = f + 1 to n do
8:
ur,j = ur,j − lr,f uf,j
9:
end for
10:
end for
11:
end if
12:
Compute lj,j = 1
13:
if j =
6 n then
14:
Determine pivot rows in column j of U
15:
Interchange the jth element of row j with the jth element of the pivot
row in U and L
16:
for r = j + 1 to n do
u
17:
Compute lr,j = ur,j
j,j
18:
Compute ur,j = 0
19:
end for
Transmit columns 1, 2..., j of L and pivot row indexes to SMj+1 .
20:
21:
else
22:
Notify the collector that L and U are available
23:
Transmit all the n pivot row indexes to SM0
24:
end if
25: end if
Figure 4.4
Procedure 3: LU Decomposition with Partial Pivoting
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Input: j → SMj
1: if j = 0 or SMj receives packets from SMj−1 then
2:
if j = 0 then
3:
Compute y1 = P t1 and transmit y1 to SM1
4:
end if
5:
if 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 then
6:
Compute yj+1 as described in (4.12) using sj−1 if necessary
7:
Transmit yj+1 to SMj+1
8:
Compute lq,j yj P
for q = j + 1, j + 2, ..., n
9:
Compute sj = jq=1 lj+1,q yq
10:
Transmit sj to SMj+1
11:
Transmit lj+2,1 y1 , ..., ln,1 y1 , ..., lj+2,j yj , ..., ln,j yj to SMj+1
12:
end if
13:
if j = n then
14:
Notify the collector that y is available
15:
end if
16: end if
Figure 4.5
Procedure 4: Forward Substitution
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Input: j → SMj
1: if j > 1 and SMj receives B1 , B2 ...Bj−1 from SMj−1 then
2:
for f = 1 to j − 1 do
3:
for r = n − 1 to f do
4:
Update elements in column j of P using Gr,f and Gr+1,f as described in (4.20).
5:
end for
6:
end for
7:
for q = n to j + 1 do
8:
Compute cq,j and sq,j using (4.19) and store them
9:
Zero element pq,j using (4.20)
10:
end for
11: end if
12: if j = 1 then
13:
for q = n to j + 1 do
14:
Compute cq,j and sq,j using (4.19) and store them
15:
Zero element pq,j using (4.20)
16:
end for
17: end if
18: if j 6= n then
19:
Transmit B1 ...Bj to SMj+1
20: else
21:
Transmit B1 ...Bj to the collector
22: end if
Figure 4.6
Procedure 5: Distributed QR Decomposition
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1: if j = n or SMj receives packet from SMj+1 then
2:

Compute kj as described in (4.23) using sj+1 if necessary

3:

Compute E(kj ) and transmit E(kj ) to the collector

4:

Compute rq,j kj for q = j − 1, j − 2, ..., 1

5:

if j =
6 1 then
Pn

6:

Compute sj =

7:

Transmit sj to SMj−1

8:

Transmit r1,j kj , ..., rj−2,j kj , r1,j+1 kj+1 , ..., rj−2,j+1 kj+1 , ..., r1,n kn , ...,

q=j

rj−1,q kq

rj−2,n kn to SMj−1
9:

end if

10: end if

Figure 4.7
Procedure 6: Backward Substitution
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1: repeat
2:
The collector instructs all SMs to take n samples with a initial sampling pe3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

riod SP
Run the LUD/LUDP/QRD algorithm
if The collector receives all elements in k then
Y = the number of elements in k unequal to 1, i.e., the number of illegal
SMs
end if
The collector calculates the probability that there are Y illegal users according
to (4.24) or (4.27) or (4.28), denoted by P .
if P < th (a threshold) or P = 1 then
SP = SP − g (g > 0 is a step variable)
end if
until P ≥ th and k does not change any more
Figure 4.8
Procedure 7: Adaptive LUD/LUDP/QRD Algorithm
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Figure 4.9
Elements of k obtained by the LUD algorithm.
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(b) LUDP and QRD

Figure 4.10
Elements of k obtained by the LUD, LUDP, and QRD algorithms in a network of 50 users.
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Figure 4.11
Elements of k obtained by the LUDP and QRD algorithms – constant cheating probability.
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Figure 4.12
Elements of k obtained by the LUDP and QRD algorithms – variable cheating probability.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation studies optimal energy management, and privacy-preserving energy
theft detection in smart grids. In Chapter 2, we consider a third-party managing the energy
consumption of a group of smart grid users, and formulate the load scheduling problem
as a constrained multi-objective optimization problem. The frst objective is to minimize
the total energy consumption cost, while the second is to maximize its utility measured
by a certain utility function. To solve the problem, we develop an evolutionary algorithm
(EA), called LSEA, to retrieve a set of Pareto-optimal solutions and show the trade-offs
between the energy consumption cost and the utility. To improve the algorithm effciency,
we design ǫ-LSEA, an ǫ-Pareto evolutionary algorithm that fnds ǫ-Pareto fronts of the
objective space. Extensive simulations were conducted to evaluate the performance of the
proposed algorithms. We can observe that ǫ-LSEA is more effcient compared to LSEA.
In Chapter 3, we study the optimal energy management problem taking into consideration unpredictable load demands and distributed energy resources. Both delay intolerant
(DI) and delay tolerant (DT) load demands were studied. We frst formulated an optimization problem, which turned out to be a time-coupling problem and prohibitively expensive
to solve. Then, we reformulated the problem using Lyapunov optimization theory and de-
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veloped a dynamic energy management scheme that can dynamically solve the problem
in each time slot based only on the current system state. Through mathematical analysis,
we were able to obtain both a lower and an upper bound on the optimal result of the original optimization problem. Furthermore, in the case of both DI and DT load demands, we
showed that DT load demands are guaranteed to be served within user-defned deadlines.
Extensive simulations were conducted to validate the effciency of the developed schemes.
In Chapter 4, we have presented three P2P computing algorithms, i.e., LUD, LUDP, and
QRD, which can identify the users who are stealing energy in smart grids while preserving
all users’ privacy. The three algorithms are distributed algorithms and are based on LU or
QR decomposition. We can observe that no private data from any user needs to be transmitted to other users or to the collector, which cannot be recovered either, thus preserving
users’ privacy. We have also analyzed the computational and communication complexities
of the proposed algorithms, and fnd that QRD has higher computational complexity and
higher communication complexity compared to LUDP. Moreover, extensive simulations
have been conducted. The simulation results show that fraudulent users can be detected
both when they commit energy theft at a constant rate, i.e., with constant honesty coeffcients, and when they steal energy at variable rates, i.e., with variable honesty coeffcients.
To conclude, we describe our plans for future work. In Chapters 2 and 3 , we observe
that the energy consumption schedules found by our proposed algorithms may not be compatible with the underlying physical characteristics of the power system, e.g., a generator
may be too slow to adjust its output to satisfy the schedule, or a power line may be overloaded during certain time slots. Hence, to have a holistic modeling of the energy manage118

ment problem, we can consider the physical characteristics of the power system. Moreover,
analyzing the energy theft detection algorithms presented in Chapter 4, we observe that the
utility company needs an approximation of the network’s thermal losses to adjust the linear
system of equations, which may sometimes be infeasible in practice. Future work for energy theft detection includes taking into account the physical characteristics of the power
system, i.e., voltages, currents, and impedances, to enable real-time calculation of thermal
losses. Moreover, by considering stronger energy thieves, i.e., thieves that can completely
compromise their smart meters, we can design more robust energy theft detection algorithms.
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